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to	 several	 risk	 types	 and	 organisations;	 they	 recur,	 often	 with	 serious	 health,	 environmental	 and	 economic	
consequences,	across	different	organisational	types	and	in	the	context	of	different	risks	and	cultures.	
Identifying	 deficits	 in	 existing	 risk	 governance	 structures	 and	 processes	 is	 now	 another	 significant	 element	 of	
IRGC’s	methodology.	The	concept	of	risk	governance	deficits	–	which	can	be	either	deficiencies	or	failures	within	
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IRGC	defines	risk	governance	deficits	as	deficiencies	
(where	 elements	 are	 lacking)	 or	 failures	 (where	
actions	are	not	 taken	or	 prove	unsuccessful)	 in	 risk	
governance	structures	and	processes.	They	hinder	a	
fair	and	efficient	risk	governance	process.











The	 potential	 consequences	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits	can	be	severe	in	terms	of	human	life,	health,	
the	 environment,	 technology,	 financial	 systems	 and	
the	economy	as	well	as	social	and	political	institutions.	
There	may	 be	 a	 failure	 to	 trigger	 necessary	 action,	
which	 may	 be	 costly	 in	 terms	 of	 lives,	 property	 or	
assets	 lost;	 or	 the	 complete	 opposite	 –	 an	 over-
reaction	or	 inefficient	action	which	 is	costly	 in	 terms	
of	 wasted	 resources.	 Consequences	 of	 deficits	
can	 also	 discourage	 the	 development	 of	 new	
technologies,	 as	 they	 can	 lead	 to	 a	 suffocation	 of	
innovation	 (through	 over-zealous	 regulation)	 or	 to	
unintended	consequences	(through	failing	to	account	
for	secondary	 impacts).	Loss	of	public	 trust	 in	 those	
responsible	 for	 assessing	 and	 managing	 risk	 or	 an	
unfair	(or	inequitable)	distribution	of	risks	and	benefits	
are	other	possible	adverse	outcomes.
By	 identifying	 and	 describing	 these	 important	
deficits,	this	report	aims	to	help	risk	decision-makers	
in	 government	 and	 industry	 understand	 both	 the	
causes	of	deficits	 in	 risk	governance	processes	and	
their	 capacity	 to	 aggravate	 the	 adverse	 impacts	 of	
a	 risk.	With	 this	 understanding,	 it	 is	 hoped	 that	 risk	
practitioners	 will	 be	 able	 to	 identify	 and	 take	 steps	
to	 remedy	 significant	 deficits	 in	 the	 risk	 governance	
structures	 and	 processes	 in	which	 they	 play	 a	 part,	
including	 those	 that	 may	 be	 found	 within	 their	 own	
organisations.
Although	 presented	 in	 this	 report	 as	 distinct	
phenomena,	 with	 their	 respective	 causes,	 drivers,	
properties	and	effects,	deficits	can	be	inter-related	(for	








and	 development	 of	 knowledge,	 understanding	 and	
evaluation	of	risks.	Those	in	the	management	sphere	




–	 for	 example,	 the	 outbreak	 of	 “mad	 cow	 disease”,	
Bovine	 Spongiform	 Encephalopathy	 (BSE),	 in	 the	
United	 Kingdom	 (UK),	 Hurricane	 Katrina,	 fisheries	
depletion	 or	 genetically	 modified	 crops	 in	 Europe	
–in	order	 to	demonstrate	 the	severity	and	variety	of	
material	and	immaterial	impacts	they	can	have.
Cluster A: Assessing and understanding risks
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 can	 occur	 during	 risk	
assessment.	 Such	 deficits	 arise	 when	 there	 is	
a	 deficiency	 of	 either	 scientific	 knowledge	 or	 of	
knowledge	about	the	values,	interests	and	perceptions	
of	individuals	and	societies.	They	can	also	be	caused	
by	 problems	 within	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 data	 is	
collected,	analysed	and	communicated	as	knowledge,	
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The	first	few	deficits	address	difficulties	involving	the	
gathering	 and	 interpreting	 of	 knowledge	 about	 risks	
and	perceptions	of	risks:	
•	 (A1)	 the	 failure	 to	 detect	 early	 warnings	 of	 risk	
because	 of	 erroneous	 signals,	 misinterpretation	
of	 information	 or	 simply	 not	 enough	 information	
being	gathered;	
•	 (A2)	 the	 lack	 of	 adequate	 factual	 knowledge	 for	
robust	risk	assessment	because	of	existing	gaps	
in	scientific	knowledge	or	 failure	 to	either	source	
existing	 information	 or	 appreciate	 its	 associated	
uncertainty;	and	








input	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 risk	 assessment	




•	 (A6)	 the	 misrepresentation	 of	 information	 about	
risk,	 whereby	 biased,	 selective	 or	 incomplete	
knowledge	 is	 used	 during,	 or	 communicated	







multiple	 dimensions	 of	 a	 risk	 and	 its	 potential	
consequences;	




way	 to	 create	 and	 understand	 knowledge	 about	





that	 understanding	 and	 assessing	 risks	 is	 not	 a	
neat,	 controllable	 process	 that	 can	 be	 successfully	
completed	by	following	a	checklist.	Rather,	this	deficit	
is	about	assessing	potential	surprises.	It	occurs	when	
risk	 assessors	 or	 decision-makers	 fail	 to	 overcome	
cognitive	 barriers	 to	 imagining	 that	 events	 outside	
expected	paradigms	are	possible.	
Cluster B: Managing risks
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 can	 also	 occur	 during	 risk	
management.	These	deficits	concern	responsibilities	




















the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 (efficiency)	 of	 various	
options	and	how	these	are	distributed	(equity);	
•	 (B6)	 a	 failure	 to	 anticipate	 the	 consequences,	





and	 require	 a	 long-term	 perspective)	 with	
decision-making	pressures	and	incentives	(which	
may	 prioritise	 visible,	 short-term	 results	 or	 cost	
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reductions);	and,	lastly,
•	 (B8)	a	failure	to	adequately	balance	transparency	
and	 confidentiality	 during	 the	 decision-making	
process,	 which	 can	 have	 implications	 for	
stakeholder	trust	or	for	security.	
Each	of	 these	deficits	has	 the	capacity	 to	derail	 the	
risk	management	process	–	even	if	other	deficits	are	
avoided.	 For	 example,	 no	 matter	 how	 successfully	
an	 organisation	 coordinates	 its	 resources	 to	 quickly	
implement	 a	 strategy	 or	 enforce	 a	 regulation,	 the	
results	 will	 be	 inadequate	 if	 the	 original	 strategy	 or	
regulation	was	flawed	from	the	beginning.	




to	properly	understand	 the	context	of	 the	 risk	 issue,	
which	 inevitably	 must	 guide	 the	 response.	 These	
deficits	are:	












adequately	 to	 unexpected	 events	 because	 of	
bad	 planning,	 inflexible	 mindsets	 and	 response	




because	 of	 shortcomings	 in	 terms	 of	 resources,	
willpower	or	coordination:	
•	 (B5)	 a	 failure	 to	 implement	 risk	 management	
strategies	or	policies	and	to	enforce	them;	
•	 (B9)	 a	 lack	 of	 adequate	 organisational	 capacity	
(assets,	 skills	 and	 capabilities)	 and/or	 of	 a	
suitable	 culture	 (one	 that	 recognises	 the	 value	
of	 risk	 management)	 for	 ensuring	 managerial	
effectiveness	when	dealing	with	risks;	and,	finally,	




Risk governance deficits: a real-world example









early	 warning	 signals	 of	 its	 emergence;	 cattle	 were	
sick,	 but	 there	 was	 no	 clear	 cause.	 Additionally,	
risk	 assessors	 did	 not	 possess	 adequate	 scientific	









uncertainty	 and	 repeatedly	 assured	 the	 public	 that	
British	beef	was	safe	to	eat.	Even	as	evidence	of	BSE’s	
transmissibility	 to	 other	 species	 (such	 as	 cats	 and	
pigs)	began	to	mount,	authorities	gave	the	public	the	
impression	that	BSE	was	not	transmissible	to	humans.	

























Dispersed	 responsibilities	 (B10)	 also	 caused	 a	
number	 of	 problems	 throughout	 the	 handling	 of	 the	
crisis.	 Communication	 and	 collaboration	 were	 slow	
or	 non-existent	 between	 the	 Department	 of	 Health	
(responsible	 for	 public	 health)	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Foods	(MAFF,	responsible	
for	 animal	 health	 and	agricultural	 interests).	 Internal	
divisions	 and	 contradictions	 within	 MAFF	 further	
complicated	matters.
Overall,	 dealing	 with	 BSE	 and	 its	 consequences	




BSE	 and	 the	 other	 illustrations	 used	 in	 this	 report	
demonstrate	the	impact	of	risk	governance	deficits	on	
past	risk	issues.	They	also	show	how	the	underlying	
concept	 of	 deficits	 reflects	 the	 interactive	 process	
between	 risk	assessment	and	management,	as	well	
as	 that	 between	 risk	 generators	 and	 those	 affected	
by	it.
Overall,	 this	 report	 can	 be	 used	 by	 organisations	
as	a	checklist	 to,	 first,	evaluate	 the	 risk	governance	
processes	of	which	they	are	a	part	and,	then,	prioritise	
those	which	are	most	in	need	of	improvement.




international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
Risk	 governance	 deficits	 are	 deficiencies	 or	 failures	
in	 the	 identification,	 assessment,	 management	 or	
communication	 of	 risks,	 which	 constrain	 the	 overall	
effectiveness	 of	 the	 risk	 governance	 process.	
Understanding	 how	 deficits	 arise,	 what	 their	
consequences	can	be	and	how	their	potential	negative	
impact	can	be	minimised	is	a	useful	starting	point	for	
dealing	 with	 emerging	 risks	 as	 well	 as	 for	 revising	
approaches	to	more	familiar,	persistent	risks.		
The	aim	of	 this	document	 is	 to	provide	guidance	on	
identifying	 risk	 governance	 deficits	 and	 to	 improve	
understanding	 of	 the	 causes	 of	 failures	 in	 risk	
governance	processes	as	 they	occurred	 in	 the	past,	
occur	 now	 and	 will	 probably	 recur	 in	 the	 future	 if	
institutions	 and	 processes	 are	 unaware	 of	 these	
problems	or	do	not	develop	appropriate	strategies	to	
avoid	 them.	 It	also	aims	 to	 improve	 the	skills	of	 risk	
managers	 in	 judging	 which	 deficits	 are	 likely	 to	 be	
relevant	to	particular	circumstances	and	in	recognising	
which	 deficits	 can	 be	 eliminated	 or	 mitigated.	 The	
audience	 for	 the	 report	 includes	 policymakers,	
regulators,	industry,	scientists	and	non-governmental	
organisations	 (NGOs):	 in	short,	all	 those	 involved	 in	
assessing	and	managing	risk.
The	 potential	 consequences	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits	 can	 include,	 for	 example,	 lost	 opportunities	
and	 unrealised	 benefits,	 diminution	 of	 technological	
innovation	and	diffusion,	and	the	loss	of	public	trust.	
Many	 consequences	of	 deficits	may	not	 be	 clear	 or	
quantifiable	at	 the	 time	of	 their	occurrence,	but	 they	
can	 nonetheless	 be	 severe.	 One	 result	 of	 the	 BSE	
crisis	is	that	it	has	taken	years	for	the	UK	government	
to	rebuild	public	confidence	in	the	UK	and	around	the	
world	 in	 the	British	 food	supply.	Another	example	 is	
asbestos,	which	was	recognised	as	harmful	to	health	
as	early	as	1898,	but	 the	 regulation	of	which	 is	 still	
incomplete	 (or	 non-existent)	 in	 some	 countries.	 It	 is	
estimated	that	in	the	European	Union	(EU)	alone,	the	




or	 human	 origin,	 including	 natural	 catastrophes,	
pandemics/epidemics,	risks	arising	from	lack	of	clean	
water,	 climate	 change,	 pollution,	 biodiversity	 loss,	
poverty,	 drug	 abuse,	 obesity,	 violence,	 geo-political	
risks,	 technology-based	 risks,	 infrastructure	 risks	 or	
financial	risks.	Together	they	harm	millions	of	people	















risks	 are	 at	 the	 crossroads	between	natural	 events;	
economic,	 social	 and	 technological	 developments;	
and	 policy-driven	 actions,	 both	 at	 the	 domestic	 and	
international	level”	[IRGC,	2005].	The	rapid	spread	of	
Severe	Acute	Respiratory	Syndrome	(SARS)	to	many	
countries,	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 trade,	 tourism	 and	 the	
economy	as	well	as	on	public	health,	is	one	example	
of	 a	 systemic	 risk;	 others	 include	 the	 cascading	






of	 the	 planet	 depends.	 IRGC	 focusses	 on	 systemic	




Risk	 governance	 deficits	 operate	 at	 various	 stages	
of	 the	governance	process,	 from	 the	early	warnings	
of	possible	 risk	 to	 the	 formal	stages	of	assessment,	
I Introduction
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management	 and	 communication.	 Both	 under-
estimation	 and	 over-estimation	 can	 be	 observed	 in	
risk	assessment,	which	may	lead	to	under-reaction or	
over-reaction	 in	 risk	management.	 Even	when	 risks	
are	 assessed	 in	 an	 adequate	 manner,	 managers	
may	 under-	 or	 over-react	 and,	 in	 situations	 of	 high	
uncertainty,	this	may	become	clear	only	after	the	fact.	
Human	 factors	 influence	 risk	 governance	 deficits	
through	 an	 individual’s	 values	 (including	 appetite	
for	 risk),	 personal	 interests	 and	 beliefs,	 intellectual	
capabilities,	 the	 prevailing	 regulations	 or	 incentives,	
but	 also	 sometimes	 through	 irrational	 or	 ill-informed	
behaviour.	The	report	illustrates	the	impact	of	human	
factors	on	 risk	governance,	 for	example	 in	 the	case	
of	 fraud	 (Enron),	or	 the	adoption	by	well-intentioned	
regulators	of	an	over-zealous	or	apathetic	approach	
to	new	risks.	
For	 each	 risk	 governance	 deficit,	 this	 report	 first	
provides	 a	 brief	 generic	 description,	 giving	 short	



























In	 considering	 the	 causes	 of	 the	 most	 frequently	
occurring	 risk	 governance	 deficits,	 this	 report	
is	 organised	 into	 two	 clusters	 related	 to	 (A)	 the	
assessment and understanding of risks	 (including	
early	 warning	 systems),	 and	 (B)	 the	 management 
of risks (including	 issues	 of	 conflict	 resolution).	




report	 risk	communication	 issues	are	 integrated	 into	
many	of	the	deficit	descriptions	rather	than	addressed	
separately.	This	integrative	role	of	risk	communication	
is	 also	 emphasised	 in	 the	 IRGC	 Risk	 Governance	
Framework	 in	a	way	 that	distinguishes	 it	 from	many	
conventional	 concepts	 in	 which	 risk	 communication	
is	 either	 a	 separate	 category	 or	 only	 a	 part	 of	 risk	
management.
• Cluster A describes	10	deficits	that	can	arise	when	
there	is	a	deficiency	of	either	scientific	knowledge	
or	 knowledge	 about	 the	 values,	 interests	 and	
perceptions	of	individuals	and	organisations.	
• Cluster B describes	13	deficits	related	to	the	role	
of	 organisations	 and	 people	 in	 managing	 risks,	
showing	 the	 need	 for	 adequate	 risk	 cultures,	
structures	and	processes.
This	 report	 can	 serve	 as	 guidance	 for	 policymakers	
and	 practitioners	 in	 the	 public,	 private	 and	 non-
governmental	sectors	concerned	with	fair	and	efficient	
risk	 governance	 and	 interested	 in	 avoiding	 risk	
governance	deficits	and	their	impacts.	The	guidance	is	
therefore	intended	to	promote	thinking	about	whether	
an	organisation	has	 the	 right	procedures	 in	place	 to	
deal	with	risks	as	they	are	recognised,	even	risks	that	
are	 only	 vaguely	 known	 or	 the	 full	 ramifications	 of	
which	are	not	yet	understood.
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ambiguity.	 It	 is	needed	 to	clarify	 the	often	confusing	
interactions	between	multiple	sources	of	harm,	what	
causes	 them	 to	 become	 risks,	 and	 their	 potential	
physical,	 social	 and	 economic	 consequences.	
Knowledge	 can	 also	 help	 to	 quantify	 the	 levels	 of	
risk	 to	 be	 experienced	 by	 different	 individuals	 and	
communities.	
Understanding	 is	 equally	 important.	 If	 knowledge	









2. Knowledge of risk perceptions	 and	 their	
underlying	 determinants	 and	 consequences,	
such	 as:	 stakeholders’	 interests	 and	 values;	
recent	coverage	of	risk	in	the	mass	media;	and,	
the	social,	economic	and	political	consequences	
of	 conflict	 between	 experts’,	 decision-makers’	
and	lay-peoples’	perceptions	of	risk.






•	 A	 lack	 of	 scientific	 evidence	 about	 the	 risk	
itself,	 or	 of	 the	 perceptions	 that	 individuals	 and	
organisations	have	of	the	risk;




•	 Misuse	 of	 available	 knowledge,	 intentionally	 or	
unintentionally.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 acknowledge	 that	 there	 will	 never	
be	 sufficient	 capacity	 to	 assess	 all	 the	 information	
relevant	 to	 a	 systemic	 risk.	 Thus	 a	 crucial	 skill	 of	
the	 risk	 assessor,	 and	 responsible	 managers,	 is	
deciding	what	 information	 can	 be	 ignored	 and	what	
simplifications	can	be	made.	For	 risks	of	a	systemic	
nature,	a	holistic	approach	to	risk	assessment	would	
be	 ideal,	 encompassing	 the	 full	 scope	 and	 scale	 of	
the	risk,	but	this	is	not	practicable.	Conclusions	need	
to	be	drawn	 from	analyses	with	more	 limited	scope.	






In	 dealing	 with	 these	 challenges,	 IRGC’s	 approach	
to	 risk	 governance	 highlights	 the	 related	 knowledge	
requirements.	IRGC	applies	the	term	complex	to	risks	
for	which	 it	 is	difficult	 to	 identify	and	quantify	causal	
interactions	 among	many	 potential	 agents	 and	 thus	
to	 determine	 specific	outcomes.	Complexity	 is	 often	
inherent	in	natural	and	man-made	phenomena	and	is	
not	 just	 a	 deficit	 of	 understanding	 or	measurement.	
The	 term	 uncertainty	 is	 used	 by	 IRGC	 to	 refer	 to	
a	 state	 of	 knowledge	 in	 which	 the	 likelihood	 of	
any	 adverse	 effect,	 or	 indeed	 the	 nature	 of	 the	
effects	 themselves,	 cannot	 be	 precisely	 described.	
Ambiguity	occurs	when	 there	are	several	alternative	
interpretations	 of	 risk	 assessment	 information.	 For	
simple	risks	(e.g.,	the	risk	of	fire	in	a	residential	home),	
a	promising	regulatory	action	may	be	straightforward	
(e.g.,	 required	 installation	 of	 smoke	 detectors	 and	
sprinklers).	However,	for	the	complex, uncertain	and/
or	ambiguous	 risks	described	here,	 risk	assessment	




and	 globalisation	 in	 information	 and	 communication	
II Cluster A: Assessing and understanding risks
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technologies	 have	 created	 more	 interdependencies	
between	regions	of	the	planet.	No	sector	of	society	–	
economic,	 environmental,	 technological,	 religious	 or	
socio-political	–	is	isolated	from	this	interdependence.	
Complexity,	uncertainty	and	ambiguity	make	precise	
risk	 assessment	 more	 challenging	 and	 demand	
both	 analytical	 and	 organisational	 innovation	 from	
participants	in	risk	governance.
These	problems	apply	 in	both	the	public	and	private	








now	having	 privatised	 the	 supply	 and	distribution	 of	
gas	and	electricity,	while	energy	policy	remains	in	the	
hands	of	the	government)	or	assessing	the	potential	





This	 cluster	 describes	 deficits	 in	 risk	 governance	
relating	 to	 the	 research,	 analysis,	 interpretation	 and	
communication	 of	 knowledge	 about	 systemic	 risks.	
Each	deficit	is	accompanied	by	real-world	illustrations	
of	 how	 the	 deficit	 has	 affected	 past	 or	 current	 risk	
governance	activities.
A1 Early warning systems
Missing, ignoring or exaggerating early 
signals of risk 
The	 basic	 problem	 is	 simple:	 how	 do	 we	 look	 for	
something	 that	 we	 do	 not	 yet	 know	 about	 or	 fully	
understand?	Early	warning	systems	as	a	 foundation	
of	 risk	 governance	 may	 be	 formal	 (as	 in	 the	 radar	
systems	used	 to	 detect	 Luftwaffe	missions	 in	World	
War	 II)	 or	 informal	 (as	 in	 the	 discovery	 by	 Turkish	
haematologists	 that	shoemakers	who	used	benzene	
as	 a	 solvent	 for	 adhesives	 contracted	 aplastic	
anaemia	and	other	blood	abnormalities).	When	early	
warning	 systems	 are	 perfect,	 they	 prevent	 serious	
harm	without	causing	any	false	alarms.




warning	 system	 accumulates	 information	 until	 a	
determination	 is	made	 (based	on	human	 judgement	
and/or	a	computer	algorithm)	as	to	whether	something	






False	 negatives	 (no	 indication	 of	 a	 risk	 when	 one	
is	 actually	 present)	 and	 false	 positives	 (erroneous	
signals	indicating	something	is	present	when	it	is	not)	
in	 early	 warning	 systems	 are	 unfortunate	 realities.	
When	a	system	is	too	insensitive,	it	fails	to	detect	an	
emerging	 risk	 (e.g.,	 the	signal-to-noise	 ratio	may	be	
too	small,	causing	the	system	to	miss	the	worrisome	
evidence).	False	negatives	are	harmful	because	they	
allow	 an	 emerging	 risk	 to	 unfold	 without	 in-depth	
risk	 assessment	 or	 preventive	 action	 being	 taken	
by	decision-makers	before	any	damage	occurs.	For	
example,	if	a	new	technology	increases	the	risk	of	a	




False	 positives	 can	 also	 be	 a	 serious	 problem	 if	
decision-makers	expend	resources	needlessly,	leaving	
fewer	 resources	 available	 to	 address	 genuine	 risks.	
False	positives	–	especially	 if	 they	occur	 repeatedly	
–	can	also	create	a	potential	crisis	of	confidence	(or	




helped	 create	 a	 climate	 of	 complacency	 at	 Pearl	
Harbour	prior	to	the	Japanese	attack	at	the	onset	of	
World	 War	 II’s	 Pacific	 engagement.	 More	 recently,	
concerns	have	been	raised	that	over-reliance	on	high-
dose	 animal	 experiments	may	 have	 produced	 false	
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positives	 in	 chemical	 regulation.	 For	 example,	 the	
artificial	 sweetener	 saccharin	 was	 shown	 to	 cause	
bladder	tumours	when	huge	doses	were	administered	
to	 rodents	 in	 the	 laboratory	 and	 the	 United	 States	
Food	 and	Drug	Administration	 (FDA)	 sought	 to	 ban	
the	sweetener.	Further	scientific	evidence	from	biology	




and	 problematic.	 Creative	 innovations	 in	 warning	






but	 it	 is	not	yet	clear	whether	 the	presence	of	 these	
chemicals	in	small	quantities	is	an	indicator	of	potential	
harm.	
Human	 judgement	 in	 the	 design	 of	 early	 warning	
systems	 and	 the	 subjective	 interpretation	 of	 their	




with	 warning	 systems,	 whether	 engaged	 in	 horizon	
scanning	 for	 governments	 or	 risk	 management	 in	
business,	need	to	be	both	rigorous	and	open-minded	
as	to	the	interpretation	of	signals,	which	means	being	
attentive	 to	 low-level	 or	 subtle	 signals	without	 over-
reacting	to	random	noise	in	data.	
The subprime crisis in the United States
- The risks of home foreclosures were spread to investors throughout the world without transparency about what those 
risks actually were, while the few experts expressing concern were ignored.
The	subprime	crisis	that	began	in	2007	originated	in	the	US,	had	major	adverse	impacts	
on	the	international	financial	system	and	rapidly	grew	into	a	global	economic	crisis.	Some	








and	 credit	 history	were	 insufficient	 to	meet	 standard	 (“prime”)	 qualification	 thresholds;	 the	 creation	and	 sale	 to	
investors	 of	 increasingly	 complex	 financial	 products	 (securities)	 linked	 to	 these	 subprime	mortgages,	 products	










consequences”	of	credit-risk	 transfer	 (a	driving	 force	 for	 the	sale	of	derivatives	based	on	subprime	mortgages)	
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Tsunami early warning system in South-East Asia
- Lessons learned from a past failure led to the development of a promising new early warning system.








was	 launched	 under	 the	 auspices	 of	 the	 United	 Nations	 Educational,	 Scientific	 and	
Cultural	Organisation	(UNESCO)	and	its	Intergovernmental	Oceanographic	Commission	
in	2005	[UNESCO,	2005].	Indonesia	has	since	been	developing	and	installing	a	tsunami	







A2 Factual knowledge about risks 
The lack of adequate knowledge about a hazard, 
including the probabilities of various events 
and the associated economic, human health, 
environmental and societal consequences
This	deficit	arises	when	there	is	inadequate	knowledge	
about	 a	 hazard,	 about	 the	 probabilities	 of	 adverse	
events,	 about	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 people	 or	 other	
targets	are	exposed	or	about	the	extent	of	damages	
that	 may	 result.	 The	 lack	 of	 knowledge	 may	 occur	
because	of	insufficient	or	misdirected	scientific	efforts,	
or	 the	 requisite	 knowledge	 may	 be	 very	 difficult	 to	
obtain.	This	period	of	inadequate	knowledge	may	be	
temporary	or	it	may	persist	for	a	long	time.	If	adequate	





their	 emergent	 phase,	 a	 period	 when	 fundamental	
risk	 drivers	 or	 cause-effect	 relationships	 are	 not	 yet	
established	and	scientific	understanding	 is	 limited	or	
spotty.	Often,	rather	than	being	totally	absent,	relevant	
data	 are	 of	 poor	 quality	 or	 incomplete,	 particularly	
when	 complex	 processes	 of	 change	 are	 underway	
(e.g.,	 climate	 change),	 when	 new	 technologies	 are	
introduced	 (e.g.,	 xenotransplantation)	 [OECD,	2003]	
or	 when	 sudden	 disruptions	 take	 place	 (e.g.,	 the	
and	 improper	 regulation	of	 the	 credit	 securitisation	market	 [Economist,	 2003].	These	early	warnings,	 based	on	
professional	 judgement,	were	swept	aside	as	incorrect	or	alarmist	assumptions	concerning	market	dynamics.	In	
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2007	 collapse	 of	 housing	 prices	 in	 the	US,	UK	and	
elsewhere,	and	the	associated	global	financial	crisis).	
Sometimes	 inadequate	 knowledge	 can	 be	 traced	 to	
insufficient	 funding	of	 scientific	 research	 (this	was	a	
serious	 problem	at	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 the	 acquired	
immune	 deficiency	 syndrome,	AIDS,	 epidemic).	 But	
inadequate	 knowledge	 can	 also	 result	 when	 well-
funded	 scientists	 cling	 to	 outmoded	 theories,	 apply	
the	wrong	or	one-sided	methods	when	 investigating	
a	 new	 risk	 or	 fail	 to	 investigate	 a	 subpopulation	 (of	
people,	communities	or	wildlife)	which	 is	particularly	
vulnerable	to	an	emerging	risk.	Additionally,	scientists	
or	 decision-makers	 may	 simply	 fail	 to	 ask	 the	
important	questions,	or	they	may	even	ask	the	wrong	
questions.	
Scientific	 evidence	will	 be	 seen	 as	more	 robust	 if	 it	
is	 confirmed	by	 results	 from	more	 than	one	 source.	
Evidence	 based	 on	 anecdotal	 reports,	 though	
sometimes	 perfectly	 valid,	 is	 treated	 with	 greater	
scepticism	 than	 evidence	 from	 well-designed,	




Once	 relevant	 scientific	 data	 have	 been	 collected,	
deficits	 can	 also	 occur	 in	 the	 process	 of	 analysis	
and	 interpretation.	When	analysis	 and	 interpretation	
occur	 without	 rigorous	 peer	 review	 by	 qualified	
experts,	 errors	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 occur.	 Based	 on	
this	 experience,	 scientists	 give	more	weight	 to	 data	
that	have	been	published	in	the	open,	peer-reviewed	
literature.	 This	 can	 prove	 to	 be	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	
private	 sector,	 as	 early	 publication	 can	 undermine	
sources	of	competitive	advantage.
Difficult	 tasks	 for	 risk	 assessors	 are	 appreciating	
the	 degree	 of	 uncertainty	 associated	 with	 available	
knowledge	 (including	 any	 biases	 in	 how	 data	
are	 generated)	 and	 evaluating	 the	 impact	 of	 this	
uncertainty	 on	 the	 precision	 and	 robustness	 of	 the	
findings	of	a	risk	assessment.	Inadequate	knowledge	
will	 be	 used	 by	 some	 to	 argue	 that	 a	 risk	 has	 not	
been	 proven.	 Others	 will	 argue	 that	 the	 uncertainty	
means	 that	 an	 acceptable	 degree	 of	 safety	 has	 not	
been	established.	Given	the	imperfections	of	scientific	
and	 societal	 knowledge	 and	 understanding,	 risk	
governance	strategies	and	policy	choices	will	often	be	
made	in	the	absence	of	reliable	evidence.
Much	 of	 the	 available	 knowledge	 about	 hazards,	
including	 the	 probabilities	 and	 loss	 estimates	 in	





introduction	 of	 pseudoscientific	 claims,	 sometimes	
called	 “junk”	 science.	 The	 confusion	 resulting	 from	
pseudoscience	may	lead	to	exaggeration	of	risk	(e.g.,	
early	false	alarms	that	drinking	coffee	causes	bladder	
cancer)	 or	 false	 assurances	 of	 safety	 (e.g.,	 early	
claims	 that	 breathing	 environmental	 tobacco	 smoke	
is	harmless).
Radio-frequency electromagnetic fields 
- The tendency to confuse the lack of evidence of risk with a demonstration that no risk exists.
Radio-frequency	electromagnetic	 fields	 (EMFs)	have	been	present	 since	 the	early	20th	
century	and	human	exposure	to	them	has	grown	rapidly	in	recent	years.	Produced	primarily	
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Replacing one gasoline additive with another





of	 harmful	 carbon	monoxide	 and	 some	 other	 pollutants	when	 gasoline	 is	 combusted.	While	 alternative	 octane	
enhancers	exist	(e.g.,	ethanol),	MTBE	was	preferred	because	of	its	favourable	blending	properties	in	pipelines	and	
its	low	production	cost	[US	EPA,	2008].		
It	 was	 also	 well-known	 that	 MTBE	 had	 some	 negative	 properties.	 Laboratory	 studies	
suggested	 that,	 because	 of	 its	 limited	 biodegradability,	 MTBE	 was	 highly	 mobile	 and	
persistent	 in	 surface	 and	 groundwater	 [Barker	 et	 al.,	 1990].	 Some	 comfort	 was	 taken	
from	the	fact	that	MTBE	has	a	distinctive	odour	and	taste	that	is	detectable	at	very	low	






In	 the	mid-1990s,	 it	was	discovered	 that	MTBE	had	 leaked	 from	underground	petroleum	storage	 systems	and	
pipelines	into	numerous	bodies	of	surface	and	groundwater.	Drinking	water	supplies	were	contaminated	in	several	
communities,	including	Santa	Monica,	California.	Questions	about	the	safety	of	MTBE	led	to	hundreds	of	lawsuits	





of	 the	 standard	 toxicology	 of	MTBE	 is	 reassuring	 (i.e.,	MTBE	 is	 not	 acutely	 toxic)	 but	 the	 long-term	 safety	 of	
continuous	MTBE	exposure	is	not	well	understood,	and	a	risk	of	cancer	is	possible	[Toccalino,	2005;	Krayer	von	
Krauss	and	Harremoes,	2002].	
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A3 Perceptions of risk, including 
their determinants and 
consequences  
The lack of adequate knowledge about values, 
beliefs and interests, and therefore about how 
risks are perceived by stakeholders
Deficit	 A2	 (above)	 is	 related	 to	 knowledge	 about	
probabilities	 and	 consequences	 of	 adverse	 events,	
whereas	 this	 deficit	 focusses	 on	 knowing	 and	
understanding	 how	 risks	 are	 perceived	 by	 non-
scientific	publics,	including	ordinary	citizens,	business	
managers,	representatives	of	stakeholder	groups	and	
politicians.	 Since	 a	 variety	 of	 values,	 interests,	 and	
cultural,	 familial,	 economic	 and	 ideological	 factors	
help	 shape	 perceptions,	 social	 scientists	 contend	
that	 perceptions	 of	 risk	 are	 “socially	 constructed”	
[Bradbury,	 1989].	Effective	 risk	 governance	 requires	
consideration	 of	 both	 the	 factual	 aspects	 of	 risk	
assessment	 (A2)	 and	 the	 socially	 constructed	 (A3)	
aspects	of	perceived	risk.
Individual	 risk	 perceptions	 may	 be	 based	 on	 a	
person’s	 economic	 situation,	 personality,	 education,	






Risk	 perceptions	 are	 not	 always	 constant.	 They	
can	 change	as	 a	 result	 of	 information,	 experiences,	
dramatic	 portrayals	 in	 the	 press	 or	 entertainment	
media,	 and	 incentives,	 although	 changes	 are	 less	
likely	to	take	place	if	the	original	perception	is	based	
on	 deeply-felt	 individual	 values	 or	 group	 ideology	
[Tait,	2001].	When	perceptions	are	diffuse	or	tentative,	






case	 in	 many	 countries	 with	 nuclear	 power	 and	 in	
Europe	with	genetically	modified	(GM)	food.
Differences	 in	 perceptions	 are	 often	 studied	 at	 the	
level	of	individuals	but	variations	also	occur	between	
communities,	 countries	 and	 regions	 of	 the	 globe	
[OECD,	2003].	Terrorism	is	more	salient	in	the	Middle	
East	than	in	Australia.	The	same	risk	will	be	assessed	
as	 safer	 or	 more	 dangerous	 in	 some	 communities	
or	 countries	 than	 in	 others.	 Historically,	 Europeans	
have	 been	 more	 concerned	 than	 Americans	 about	
global	 climate	 change,	 while	Americans	 have	 been	
more	concerned	than	Europeans	about	diesel	engine	




Risk	 perceptions	may	 also	 be	 influenced	 by	 factors	
related	 to	personal	experience,	 such	as	 the	amount	
(or	distribution)	of	associated	benefits,	 the	 likelihood	
of	the	risk	affecting	identifiable	rather	than	anonymous	
victims,	 the	 familiarity	of	 the	risk	source	or	 the	state	
of	 personal	 or	 scientific	 familiarity	 with	 the	 risk	
issue.	These	factors	will	also	have	an	impact	on	the	
acceptability	of	the	risk	(see	A5).	
Economists	 contend	 that	 risk	 perceptions	 are	
influenced	by	wealth	and	health	status,	including	how	
consumers	 value	 future	 gains	 or	 losses	 compared	
to	 present-day	 welfare.	 For	 example,	 investors	 in	
the	 stock	 market	 vary	 enormously	 in	 terms	 of	 their	




additive.	A	 panel	 established	 by	 the	US	Environmental	 Protection	Agency	 (EPA)	 in	 1998	 to	 address	 concerns	
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Some	people	are	fascinated	by	casinos;	others	avoid	
them.		
Perceived	 risks	 can	 be	 very	 different	 from	 the	




by	 scientific	 assessments,	 while	 pathogens	 in	 food	
are	 often	 judged	 by	 the	 public	 as	 less	 risky	 than	
scientific	 assessments	 suggest.	 A	 risk	 assessment	
deficit	 can	 result	 from	 the	 inadequate	 handling	 of	 a	
situation	 where	 the	 predominant	 public	 perceptions	
diverge	from,	or	even	contradict,	assessments	based	
on	scientific	evidence.
A	 concern	 assessment	 by	 social	 scientists	 as	
suggested	in	the	IRGC	framework	[IRGC,	2005]	can	
be	 of	 great	 assistance	 to	 policymakers	 by	 helping	
them	to	understand	social	claims	and	positions	and	to	
place	concerns	in	a	larger	cultural	context.	However,	












 - An example of how different risk perceptions can influence risk governance around the world.
In	Europe,	risk	perception	of	genetically	modified	organisms	(GMOs)	involves	moral	considerations	(ethical	aspects,	
“interfering	 with	 nature”),	 democratic	 considerations	 (mistrust	 of	 multinational	 companies	 and	 governments),	






to	support	decisions	based	on	scientific	evidence	and	 to	offer	 their	populations	 the	choice	of	whether	or	not	 to	
purchase	GM	foods.
Other	 motives,	 predominantly	 economic	 and	 protectionist,	 have	 also	 influenced	 the	
evolution	 of	 European	 regulation	 of	GMOs.	 In	 a	 dispute	 between	 the	US	 and	 the	 EU	
over	 the	 trade	of	GM	crops	 (including	permission	 for	US-based	companies	 to	 sell	GM	
seeds	in	Europe),	the	World	Trade	Organization	[WTO,	2003]	concluded	that	Europe	may	
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A4 Stakeholder involvement  
Failure to adequately identify and involve 
relevant stakeholders in risk assessment in 
order to improve information input and confer 
legitimacy on the process
Risk	 assessment	 can	 be	 compromised	 when	
important	 stakeholders	 are	 excluded	 from	 the	
process.	Stakeholders	may	have	biases	but	they	often	
bring	 indispensable	 or	 useful	 data	 and	 experience	
to	 the	 risk	 assessment	 process.	 Excluding	 relevant	
stakeholders	also	reduces	trust	in	the	resulting	analytic	
determinations	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 subsequent	
policy	 decisions.	 There	 are	 multiple	 methods	 for	






stakeholders	and	 involve	 them	 in	a	 risk	dialogue.	At	
this	time,	decisions	need	to	be	made	as	to	the	precise	
nature	and	understanding	of	 the	 risk	 itself	 (how	 it	 is	
“framed”),	the	scope	and	depth	of	a	risk	assessment,	
the	 types	of	data	 that	will	 be	collected,	 the	 types	of	
experts	 and	 contractors	 that	 will	 be	 commissioned,	
and	the	schedule	for	preparing	and	reviewing	the	risk	
assessment	 report.	 Stakeholders	 may	 have	 useful	
input	on	all	of	these	questions.		
Risk perceptions of nuclear power  
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Just	as	important	as	the	task	of	gathering	knowledge	
is	the	process	of	engagement	that	can	lead	to	better	
risk	 communication.	Creating	 an	 interactive	 process	
for	 exchanges	 of	 information	 or	 opinion	 between	






Identifying	 and	 selecting	 which	 stakeholders	 should	
participate	 in	 risk	 assessment	 is	 important	 and	 not	
always	straightforward.	It	may	be	a	mistake	to	 invite	
only	 those	with	extreme	views	about	 risk	but	 it	may	
also	be	a	mistake	to	 include	only	 those	with	centrist	
interpretations	 of	 the	 science.	 While	 it	 is	 important	
to	be	open	 to	suggestions	 from	stakeholders,	public	




criteria	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 stakeholders	 are:	 the	
ability	 to	 contribute	 useful	 knowledge	 or	 experience	
(including,	for	example,	industry	experts	and	relevant	
day-to-day	 experiences	 of	 vulnerable	 populations	 to	
risks	such	as	flooding);	 the	capacity	 to	participate	 in	
a	 constructive	 manner;	 and,	 the	 potential	 to	 confer	
some	legitimacy	to	the	risk	assessment	process.	Here	
the	input	from	stakeholders	should	focus	on	science-
related	 issues	 (including	 perception-related	 issues	





It	 is	 not	 always	 feasible	 or	 advisable	 to	 involve	
stakeholders.	Time	and	resource	limitations	will	affect	
whether	 stakeholders	 are	 consulted,	 how	 they	 are	







appointed	officials	 accountable	 for	 risk	 decisions.	 In	
most	cases,	however,	an	opportunity	for	some	form	of	
stakeholder	involvement	is	likely	to	be	helpful.
Large infrastructure projects (dams)
- Stakeholder involvement in the risk assessment process can improve public acceptance.
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A5 Evaluating the acceptability of 
the risk  
Failure to consider variables that influence 
risk acceptance and risk appetite
Once	 a	 risk	 has	 been	 assessed	 from	 a	 scientific	
perspective	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 concerns	 and	
perspectives	 has	 been	 completed,	 decision-makers	
must	determine	whether	the	risk	 is	acceptable1		and	
thus	 whether	 it	 requires	 specific	 risk	 management.	
Although	 acceptability	 is	 a	 value-laden	 judgement	
that	 people	 may	 sometimes	 seek	 to	 avoid,	 it	 is	 a	
necessary	one	in	a	sound	risk	governance	framework.	
Essentially,	thresholds	for	risk	acceptability	depend	on	
how	 risks	 and	 benefits	 are	 balanced.	 The	 valuation	
of	potential	benefits	(whether	 this	value	 is	 related	 to	
monetary	gain,	improved	welfare,	or	moral	or	ethical	










scientists	 have	 determined	 that	 a	 variety	 of	 other	
variables	appears	to	 influence	public	acceptability	of	
risk,	beyond	the	probability	and	severity	determinations	
that	 dominate	 the	 scientific	 assessment	 of	 risk.	
These	 factors	 include:	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	 incurred	
voluntarily	 or	 is	 imposed	 on	 citizens	 without	 their	
informed	 consent;	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	 controllable	
by	 personal	 action	 or	 whether	 it	 can	 be	 managed	
only	 through	 collective	 action;	 whether	 the	 risk	 is	
incurred	 disproportionately	 by	 the	 poor,	 children,	 or	
other	 vulnerable	 subpopulations;	whether	 the	 risk	 is	
unfamiliar	and	dreadful;	whether	the	risk	results	from	
man-made	rather	 than	natural	causes;	and,	whether	
the	 risk	 raises	 questions	 of	 intergenerational	 equity	
[Bennett	and	Calman,	1999].	
Although	 a	 risk	 may	 appear	 to	 be	 acceptable	 (or	
even	 negligible)	 based	 on	 purely	 probabilistic	
considerations,	segments	of	the	public	may	consider	
it	unacceptable	for	a	variety	of	psychological	or	ethical	
reasons,	 as	 has	 happened	 with	 GMOs	 in	 Europe	
and	some	applications	of	nanotechnology	 in	several	
countries.
To	 some	 extent,	 the	 inquiry	 into	 risk	 acceptability	
draws	 on	 the	 risk	 perception	 issues	 discussed	
earlier	 (see	 A3).	 In	 some	 public	 settings,	 however,	
the	 inquiry	 is	 more	 specific	 and	 entails	 a	 formal	
determination	 of	 risk	 acceptability	 under	 an	 explicit	
statutory	 or	 administrative	 standard.	 The	 factors	
involved	 in	 a	 formal	 risk-acceptability	 decision	 may	
vary	depending	upon	the	legal	context.	Under	US	law,	
for	example,	a	distinction	 is	often	made	between	an	




as	 “unreasonable	 risk”	 and	 “negligible	 risk”	 also	
have	 specific	meanings	 under	 various	US	 laws	and	
regulations.	Such	legal	standards	of	acceptability	may	
have	less	prominence	in	countries	that	do	not	share	
the	 US	 emphasis	 on	 litigation-oriented	 solutions	 to	
risk	issues.
Deficits	 in	 risk	 acceptability	 often	 occur	 when	
organisations	and	stakeholders	fail	to	define	the	type	
and	amount	of	risk	that	they	are	prepared	to	pursue,	
retain	 or	 take	 (risk appetite)	 or	 to	 take	 relevant	
decisions	 based	 upon	 their	 attitude	 towards	 turning	
away	 from	 risk	 (risk aversion).	 This	 implies	 that,	 in	
order	 to	 make	 good	 risk	 management	 decisions	
(cluster	 B),	 organisations	 and	 stakeholders	 need	
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face	 (the	 organisation	 or	 stakeholder’s	 readiness	 to	
bear	 the	 risk	after	 risk	 treatment	 in	order	 to	achieve	
its	 objectives)	 [ISO,	 2009].	 In	 the	 private	 sector	 in	
particular,	 risk	 decisions	 will	 have	 to	 explicitly	 state	
the	 level	of	 loss	 that	 the	organisation	 is	prepared	 to	
accept	in	its	operations.
Radioactive waste disposal
- Fairness aspects in determining risk acceptability.
Radioactive	waste	disposal	 facilities	 can	pose	health	 and	environmental	 risks	 for	 local	
residents,	 both	 present	 and	 future.	 Equity	 considerations,	 intra-generational	 and	 inter-
generational,	are	thus	often	pre-eminent	when	assessing	risks	related	to	the	siting	of	such	

















A6 Misrepresenting information 
about risk  
The provision of biased, selective or incomplete 
information
This	 risk	 governance	 deficit	 refers	 to	 cases	 where	
efforts	 are	 made	 to	 manipulate	 risk	 governance	
through	 the	 provision	 of	 biased,	 selective	 or	
incomplete	 knowledge	 (or	 a	 failure	 to	 ascertain	
the	 objectivity,	 quality	 and	 certainty	 of	 submitted	









uncertainty	 and	 ambiguity	 –	 can	 be	 either	 over-	 or	
understated	 by	 participants	 in	 the	 risk	 assessment	
process.	 Strategic	 manipulation	 of	 information	 is	 a	
classic	 interest-group	 strategy	 but	 it	 is	 particularly	
difficult	 to	 challenge	 misleading	 submissions	 about	
risks	when	knowledge	is	uncertain	and	clear	evidence	
is	lacking	to	support	a	particular	position	or	decision;	
a	 fact-based	 rebuttal	 is	 therefore	 impossible.	When	
analysts	 and	 policymakers	 are	misled	 by	 erroneous	
or	 biased	 information,	 many	 types	 of	 error	 in	 risk	
management	 (e.g.,	 over-regulation,	 under-regulation	
or	 misdirected	 regulation)	 can	 occur.	 Accurately	
conveying	uncertainty	about	a	risk	(for	example,	 the	
severity	and	stage	of	a	pandemic)	can	be	challenging,	
and	 erroneous	 information	 should	 in	 this	 case	 not	
be	understood	as	a	deliberate	attempt	to	manipulate	
data.	 Misrepresentation	 may	 also,	 therefore,	 be	
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unintentional.	Recipients	of	the	information	should	be	
made	aware	of	this.
Although	 some	 prefer	 a	 risk	 assessment	 process	
that	 is	 grounded	 in	 the	 respectful	 behaviour	 typical	
of	 a	 scientific	 process,	 real-world	 risk	 assessment	
processes	 sometimes	 resemble	 a	 harsh	 political	
debate,	 and	controversy	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	deficit.	





commissioned	 themselves).	 They	 may	 also	 ignore	
evidence	 about	 fear,	 emotions	 or	 other	 perceptions	
with	regard	to	a	risk;	downplay	 it	as	being	 irrational;	
claim	that	it	is	unreliable;	or	feign	ignorance.	Or	they	





have	 in	 evaluating	 new	 information.	 People	 tend	 to	
adhere	 to	 their	 initial	beliefs,	opinions,	attitudes	and	
theories,	even	 if	 the	data	or	convictions	upon	which	
they	 were	 originally	 founded	 prove	 to	 be	 wrong	









The tobacco industry and the risks of tobacco products 















that	 restrict	 the	 freedom	of	 university-based	 researchers	 to	 accept	 research	 funding	 from	 the	 tobacco	 industry	
[UC,	2007].	Such	 restrictions	are	viewed	as	a	device	 to	protect	 the	 researcher	as	well	as	 the	 reputation	of	 the	
university.
Disposal of the Brent Spar platform
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methods,	 Shell	 decided	 that	 the	 best	 practicable	 environmental	 option	was	 deep-sea	 disposal	 in	UK	 territorial	
waters.	Permission	for	 this	option	was	granted	by	the	UK	Department	of	Trade	and	Industry	 in	December	1994	
[Löfstedt	and	Renn,	1997].	
In	early	1995,	Greenpeace	began	a	 campaign	 to	block	 the	 implementation	of	Brent	Spar’s	deep-sea	disposal,	
as	they	claimed	the	buoy	contained	large	amounts	of	oil	and	hazardous	materials	(in	line	with	its	campaign	since	
the	early	1980s	against	dumping	 in	 the	North	Sea).	An	occupation	of	Brent	Spar	by	Greenpeace	activists	and	




















BSE and beef supply in the United Kingdom
- The UK government claimed that British beef was perfectly safe to eat.
From	 the	 very	 beginning	 of	 the	 BSE	 outbreak	 in	 the	 1980s,	 knowledge	 was	 either	
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A7 Understanding complex 
systems  
A lack of appreciation or understanding of 
the potentially multiple dimensions of a risk 
and of how interconnected risk systems can 
entail complex and sometimes unforeseeable 
interactions
Interactions	 among	 the	 components	 of	 a	 complex	
system	[OECD,	2003]	 raise	numerous	difficulties	 for	
risk	 assessment.	 For	 example,	 biological	 systems	
such	 as	 those	 involving	 influenza	 in	 human,	 pig	 or	
bird	 hosts,	 or	 environmental	 systems	 such	 as	 large	
ecosystems,	can	be	very	complex,	and	this	can	lead	
to	sometimes	unforeseeable	interactions	and	potential	
deficits.	 Such	 interactions	 include	 those	 involving	 a	
system’s	buffering	capacity,	which	can	serve	either	to	
amplify	(through	positive	feedback	loops)	or	attenuate	






same	 events	 occurring	 sequentially.	 Many	 of	 the	
concepts	and	methods	applied	in	risk	assessment	of	
simpler	 situations	will	 not	 be	 adequate	 if	 applied	 to	
complex	systems	[Lagadec,	2008].
It	becomes	difficult	to	identify,	understand	and	quantify	
the	 “causal	 links	 between	 a	 multitude	 of	 potential	
causal	agents	and	specific	observed	effects”	 [IRGC,	
2005].	 It	 is	difficult	 to	assess	 the	probability	and	 the	
consequences	 of	 a	 risk	 being	 realised,	 especially	
the	 rapid	 spread	 of	 damages	 across	 geographical,	
functional	or	sectoral	boundaries.	
Where	 systemic	 interactions	 are	 possible	 or	 likely,	
assessing	 risk	 problems	without	 acknowledging	 this	
complexity	 will	 not	 be	 fully	 informative	 [Sunstein,	
2005].	 For	 example,	 some	 risk	 assessments	 fail	 to	
take	indirect	effects	or	externalities	into	account2		and	
thus	 trade-offs	 in	 decision-making	 about	 complex	
systems	are	overlooked3.		As	a	result,	efforts	to	reduce	
risks	may	create	new	(secondary)	 risks,	unexpected	
consequences	may	 occur	 in	 areas	 or	 sectors	 other	




Equally,	 the	 systemic	 nature	 of	 many	 risks	 means	
that	 there	are	 ramifications	 for	 the	assessment	 of	 a	
risk’s	scope	(domains	of	impact)	and	scale	(extent	of	
consequences).	 SARS	 was	 initially	 a	 new	 zoonotic	
disease	confined	to	China	but	spread	rapidly	to	many	








better,	 validated	 tools	 that	 are	 applicable	 in	 these	




The	 government	 backed	 up	 its	 assertions	 that	 British	 beef	was	 safe	 to	 eat	 by	 claiming	 that	 the	 precautionary	
regulatory	 controls	 it	 had	 implemented	would	prevent	 any	 contaminated	material	 from	entering	 the	 food	 chain,	
although	the	measures	were	not	designed	to	eliminate	exposure,	only	to	diminish	the	risk	[van	Zwanenberg	and	
Millstone,	2002].





international risk governance council Risk Governance Deficits
The subprime crisis in the United States



































Fisheries depletion: Barents Sea capelin
- Fishing, combined with the unexpected effects of changes in the environmental conditions, depleted the Barents Sea 
capelin stock and the entire fish ecosystem. 
In	 the	1970s,	 the	Barents	Sea	capelin	stock	maintained	an	annual	fishery	with	catches	up	 to	 three	million	 tons	
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A8 Recognising fundamental or 
rapid changes in systems  
Failure to re-assess in a timely manner fast 
and/or fundamental changes occurring in risk 
systems
Risk	 assessment	 is	 most	 straightforward	 when	 the	
analyst	 uses	 established	 tools	 in	 a	 relatively	 stable	
environment,	where	an	accurate	picture	of	the	future	
can	be	predicted	by	extrapolating	from	past	experience.	








In	 such	 dynamic	 circumstances,	 individuals	 often	
continue	to	behave	as	if	the	risks	follow	known	routines.	
They	fail	 to	recognise	the	fundamental	changes	that	





















Although	 possible	 ecological	mechanisms	 had	 been	 hypothesised	 before	 the	 collapse	
[Hamre,	 1984;	 ICES,	 1986],	 these	 were	 far	 from	 established.	 The	 collapse	 was	 later	
explained	 by	 a	 combination	 of	 environmental	 conditions.	 One	 was	 the	 unforeseen	
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state.	Such	threshold	levels	are	often	identified	in	the	







- The uncontrolled and extensive spread of the virus was unanticipated and went unnoticed for a long time.
Since	 its	first	diagnosis,	 in	 the	US	(Los	Angeles)	 in	1981,	AIDS	–	a	new	disease	now	thought	 to	have	zoonotic	
origins	–	has	become	a	pandemic	of	disastrous	proportions,	with	epidemics	of	differing	severity	occurring	 in	all	
regions	of	the	globe.	At	least	25	million	deaths	have	already	occurred.	The	very	long	latency	period	of	the	AIDS-





















Potato blight and the Irish Potato Famine
- A technological advance changed the dynamics of a system, creating new risks through allowing the spread of 
pathogens. 
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A9 The use of formal models   
An over- or under-reliance on models and/or a 
failure to recognise that models are simplified 
approximations of reality and thus can be 
fallible
Risk	 assessors	 use	 formal	 (quantitative,	 semi-
quantitative	and	qualitative)	models	both	to	understand	

















forward	 in	 time	 of	 certain	 key	 parameters	 (e.g.,	
atmospheric	temperature,	economic	growth,	stocks	of	
natural	resources,	statistics	on	population	and	ageing,	
or	 the	 number	 of	 new	 cases	 of	 HIV/AIDS	 infection)	
based	 on	 historical	 data	 and	 expert	 judgement	 of	
parameters.	Given	 the	 intrinsic	 limitations	of	models	
and	 their	 possible	 deliberate	 or	 inadvertent	misuse,	
policymaking	 and	 decision-making	 that	 is	 solely	
informed	by	or	based	on	modelling	results	is	a	frequent	
source	of	controversy.	
Without	 proper	 safeguards,	 quality	 control	 and	
transparency,	 there	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	 wrong	 risk	
mitigation	measures	or	business	and	policy	decisions	









public	 sectors,	 even	 though	 particular	 models	 or	
modelling	 predictions	may	 be	 the	 source	 of	 intense	
criticism.
The	 growing	 recourse	 to	 models	 is	 linked	 to	 the	
fact	 that	 many	 risks	 (and	 other	 challenges	 facing	
modern	 societies)	 are	 impossible	 to	 comprehend	
using	 simple	 analytical	 or	 statistical	 methods.	 The	
challenges	 involve	 diverse	 elements	 that	 interact	 in	
complex	ways	on	very	 large	scales,	 thus	precluding	
the	 use	 of	 common	 sense	 or	 historical	 precedent.	
Often,	 the	 societal	 challenges	 are	 directly	 linked	 to	
scientific	and	technological	phenomena:	for	example,	
energy	 production,	 the	 geosphere,	 climate	 change	












The	development	of	 the	clipper	constituted	a	fundamental	change	 in	 international	 trading	systems,	substantially	
increasing	the	speed	of	passenger	and	goods	movements	and	also	increasing	the	risk	of	spreading	diseases.	
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of	 information	 and	 communications	 technology	




Despite	 the	 usefulness	 of	 models,	 there	 may	 be	
situations	 where	 too	 little	 is	 known	 about	 a	 system	
or	 set	 of	 scenarios	 to	 permit	 useful	 modelling.	 For	





and	 decision-makers	 will	 typically	 seek	 some	 form	
of	 guidance,	 especially	 in	 the	 case	 of	 potentially	
catastrophic	losses.	
In	 order	 to	 ensure	 that	 decision-oriented	 models	























•	 the	 results	 that	 are	 presented	 to	 sponsors,	
colleagues	 or	 the	 public	may	 represent	 only	 the	
selected	 “best”	 instances	 of	 running	 the	 model,	
with	 dubious	 or	 incomprehensible	 results	 being	
suppressed;	





•	 	 when	 the	 results	 of	modelling	 are	made	 public,	
most	journalists	do	not	have	the	scientific	expertise	
to	 independently	assess	the	results	derived	from	
complex	 models,	 so	 they	 tend	 to	 report	 as	 fact	
the	 most	 pessimistic	 or	 sensational	 projections	
and	 results,	 without	 accurately	 presenting	
uncertainties	 or	 alternative	 viewpoints	 or	without	







positions.	Advocates	 from	 stakeholder	 groups	 (e.g.,	
environmental	 activists	 or	 industry	 associations),	
including	 academic	 scientists	 aligned	 with	 these	






that	 require	 all	 formal	 models	 used	 in	 regulatory	
policymaking	 to	 be	 transparent	 with	 regard	 to	 the	
data	 employed	 and	 the	model	 structure	 (with	 a	 few	
exceptions)	 [OMB,	 2002].	 There	 is	 also	 a	 trend,	
stimulated	 by	 some	 professional	 and	 scientific	
societies,	to	make	greater	use	of	websites	to	publicly	
disclose	 details	 about	 data	 and	 modelling	 structure	






international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
Fisheries depletion: Newfoundland cod
- Modelling used to estimate northern cod off Newfoundland proved erroneous.

























The subprime crisis in the United States
- Over-reliance on, and over-confidence in, financial models led to miscalculation of risks.
If	the	financial	sector	largely	failed	to	see	the	2007	subprime	crisis	coming	and	was	unaware	
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A10 Assessing potential surprises 
Failure to overcome cognitive barriers 










that	 rare	 events	 can	 happen,	 presumably	 because	













One	 of	 the	 advantages	 of	 computer	 models	 is	
that	 they	 allow	 us	 to	 simulate	 the	 future	 based	 on	
alternative	 –	 even	 unlikely	 –	 scenarios.	 But	 more	
sophisticated	 tools	 to	 study	 and	 model	 risk	 issues	
will	not	necessarily	resolve	this	deficit	and	expansion	




This	 requires	 integrating	 lateral	 thinkers,	 including	
people	 from	outside	 the	established	circles,	 in	order	
to	contemplate	the	unknown	(and	even	the	completely	
unimagined).	 More	 importantly	 perhaps,	 there	 is	 a	
need	to	counteract	one	of	the	many	cognitive	biases	
potentially	 affecting	 judgement	 on	 global	 risks:	 “not	
knowing	 what	 we	 do	 not	 know”,	 and	 thus	 inviting	
potential	surprises	[Yudkowsky,	2008].
A	 key	 caveat	 is	 necessary	 here	 –	 each	 prediction	
from	 unconventional	 analysis	 should	 be,	 whenever	





housing	 values.	This	made	developing	accurate	models	 very	 challenging	 (not	 least	 because	modellers	 require	
historical	data	when	building	the	models)	and	increased	the	risk	that	the	models	“were	not	up	to	the	task	they	were	










This	 indeterminacy	 introduces	 uncertainty	 into	 events	 and	 “outcomes	 are	 liable	 to	 diverge	 from	 expectations”	
[Soros,	2008].
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can	 be	 compared	 to	 that	 of	 standard	 modellers,	
and	directions	 for	 further	analytical	 attention	 can	be	
identified.	Obviously,	the	unconventional	thinkers	will	
also	have	error	rates,	potentially	large	ones.
The	 concept	 of	 unknowability	 used	 in	 financial	 risk	
assessment	 refers	 to	 “situations	 where	 the	 events	
defining	 the	space	cannot	be	 identified	 in	advance”,	
where	 there	 is	 no	 underlying	 model	 and	 risk	
assessors	are	unable	to	understand	certain	observed	
phenomena,	 conceive	 hypotheses	 and	 theories,	 or	
even	 identify	 the	 phenomena	 [Diebold	 et	 al.,	 2008].	
It	 can	be	 illustrated	by	black	holes,	which	 scientists	
could	not	look	for	until	a	theory	was	developed	about	
how	 matter	 behaves	 under	 extreme	 gravitational	
forces.	 Unknowable	 risks	 are	 subject	 to	 deficits	 in	
their	 assessment	 until	 people	 understand	 that	 their	
existence	 is	 not	 predictable;	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	
characterised,	 measured,	 prevented	 or	 transferred;	












Report,	 2004],	most	 people	 regard	 the	 9/11	 attack	 as	 unexpected	 because	 the	way	 in	
which	it	was	carried	out	was	unthinkable.	
This	could	be	blamed	on	intelligence	failures	–	failure	to	detect	early	warnings	that		such		an	attack		was		being	
planned	 	 [Gertz,	2002].	 	However,	 	any	 	such	 failure	must	be	at	 least	partly	 rooted	 in	an	 inability	 to	escape	 the	
accepted	paradigm	of	terrorist	behaviour.	As	David	T.	Jones,	a	retired	senior	US	State	Department	Foreign	Service	
officer	and	foreign	affairs	adviser	 to	 the	Army	Chief	of	Staff,	wrote	 in	2001:	“We	were	trapped	by	our	paradigm.	
Ever	since	‘modern’	terrorism	began	approximately	33	years	ago	with	the	assassination	of	US	ambassador	Gordon	
Mein,	experts	have	been	constructing	programs	to	handle	the	endless	sequence	of	hijackings	and	hostage	takings	
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functions	 is	 lacking:	 setting	 goals,	 developing	 and	
evaluating	 a	 reasonable	 range	 of	 risk	 management	





Although	 they	 have	 different	 objectives	 and	
perspectives,	both	the	public	and	private	sectors	play	
important	roles	in	risk	management.	Each	has	separate	
responsibilities,	 but	 the	 effective	 management	 of	
many	systemic	risks	requires	cohesion	between	them.	
They	are	also	prone	to	some	similar	deficiencies.	For	
example,	 pressures	 to	 address	 near-term	 concerns	
are	 prevalent	 in	 both	 sectors.	 The	 scope	 for	 action	
of	 politicians	 may	 be	 shaped	 by	 electoral	 cycles,	










Risk culture	 refers	 to	 a	 set	 of	 beliefs,	 values	 and	
practices	 within	 an	 organisation	 regarding	 how	 to	
assess,	 address	 and	manage	 risks.	A	major	 aspect	
of	risk	culture	is	how	openly	risks	can	be	addressed	
and	 information	 about	 them	 shared	 among	 a	 risk	
community.	 A	 risk	 culture	 defines	 an	 organisation’s	
risk	 appetite.	A	 good	 risk	 culture	 produces	 a	 sound	
basis	for	how	the	competing	pressures	for	risk	taking	
and	 risk	 avoidance	 are	 resolved.	 Either	 pressure,	
if	 allowed	 to	 dominate	 decision-making,	 can	 be	
detrimental.	 For	 example,	 public	 administrators	 are	
often	 criticised	 for	 being	 excessively	 risk	 averse,	 in	
part	 because	 they	 are	 more	 vulnerable	 to	 criticism	
for	 under-reacting	 to	 a	 risk	 than	 for	 over-reacting.	
Corporate	 leaders	are	often	criticised	 for	generating	
(or	 neglecting)	 environmental	 risks,	 in	 part	 because	
the	 damages	 from	 environmental	 risks,	 which	 are	
seen	as	an	externality,	are	rarely	reflected	in	corporate	




Good	 public	 and	 corporate	 management	 requires	
a	 risk	 culture	 that	 combines	 a	 need	 for	 enlightened	
risk	 taking	 with	 a	 need	 for	 prudent	 risk	 aversion.	
Risk	 culture	 will	 vary	 between	 individual	 people,	
businesses,	governments	and	nations:	 some	will	 be	
more	 risk	averse	 than	others,	 and	 their	 level	 of	 risk	
aversion/acceptance	will	itself	vary	according	to	each	
risk	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 them.	 Good	 risk	 governance	
requires	acknowledgement	of	the	lack	of	a	universal	
risk	culture.








well-intentioned	 government	 officials	 and	 business	
risk	 managers	 may	 neglect	 serious	 risks,	 make	
decisions	with	unintended	outcomes	or	 side	effects,	
or	 micromanage	 risk	 to	 the	 point	 that	 technological	
innovations	 are	 suffocated.	 Even	 large,	 well-funded	
organisations	are	often	under-equipped	 to	deal	with	
the	challenges	of	uncertain	 future	 risks	 that	arise	 in	
complex	 technological	 and	 behavioural	 systems.	





II Cluster B: Managing risks 
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In	the	following	pages,	some	important	deficits	related	
to	risk	management	are	identified	and	illustrated	with	
examples	 from	 past	 and	 current	 risk	 governance	
activities.
B1 Responding to early warnings   
Failure of managers to respond and take action 
when risk assessors have determined from 
early signals that a risk is emerging
A	 risk	 management	 deficit	 may	 arise	 when	 signals	
indicating	 a	 risk	 is	 emerging	 are	 picked	 up	 and	
assessed,	 but	 no	 decisions	 or	 actions	 are	 taken	 to	
prevent	 or	 mitigate	 the	 risk.	 The	 detection	 of	 early	
warnings	is	useful	only	if	they	are	then	prioritised	and	
followed	by	a	response	that	is	commensurate	with	the	
significance	 of	 the	 potential	 risk.	 This	 often	 implies	
the	 need	 for	 a	 prioritisation	 of	 risks,	 to	 allow	 the	
organisation	to	concentrate	on	those	most	relevant	to	
it.
The	 failure	 to	 respond	 may	 occur	 for	 a	 variety	 of	
reasons.	 In	 some	 cases	 the	 information	 gathered	
from	 early	 warnings	 and	 risk	 assessment	 is	 not	
conveyed	 to	 decision-makers.	By	definition,	 there	 is	
no	definitive	proof	in	the	case	of	early	warnings,	and	
some	professionals	will	contest	the	evidence	in	terms	
of	 what	 it	 implies	 and	 what	 concrete	 action	 should	
be	 taken.	Related	 to	 this	 point,	 a	 failure	 to	 respond	







deficit	 and	 can	 include	 unnecessary	 regulation	





number	 of	 children	 being	 vaccinated.	A	 speculative	
claim	 was	made	 in	 the	medical	 journal	The Lancet	
that	 there	 was	 a	 link	 between	 the	 vaccine	 and	
autism,	 and	 in	 June	 2008	 the	UK	Health	Protection	
Agency	 reported:	 “Due	 to	 almost	 10	 years	 of	 sub-
optimal	 MMR	 vaccination	 coverage	 across	 the	 UK,	
the	 number	 of	 children	 susceptible	 to	 measles	 is	

























Fisheries Depletion: North Sea herring 








early	warning	 signs	 again	 showed	 that	 fish	 stocks	were	 becoming	dangerously	 low,	 quick	 and	drastic	 action	 –	
including	an	EU/Norway	agreement	on	fishery	management	 in	1997	–	was	 taken	 to	avoid	another	collapse.	By	






BSE in the United Kingdom 
- Ignoring early warnings increased risks to human health.
The	 incorporation	 of	 rendered	 meat	 and	 bonemeal	 into	 animal	 feed	 creates	 a	 number	 of	 risks	 related	 to	 the	
transmission,	recycling	and	amplification	of	pathogens.	Such	risks	were	recognised	well	before	the	emergence	of	
BSE.		In		the		UK,		the		Royal		Commission		on		Environmental		Pollution		recommended			in		1979			that		minimum
processing	standards	be	 implemented	by	 the	 rendering	 industries	 in	order	 to	minimise	
the	potential	 for	 spreading	disease	 [RCEP,	1979].	The	 incoming	Thatcher	government	
withdrew	 these	 proposed	 regulations,	 preferring	 to	 let	 industry	 decide	 for	 itself	 what	
standards	to	use.	In	retrospect,	it	seems	that	the	failure	to	act	at	this	point	to	mitigate	the	
general	 risk	of	disease	 transmission	may	have	had	an	 impact	on	 the	 later	outbreak	of	
BSE,	given	that	the	disease	“probably	originated	from	a	novel	source	in	the	early	1970s”	
[BSE	Inquiry,	2000b].
Early	 signs	 that	 BSE	might	 be	 transmissible	 to	 humans	 were	 observed	 by	 scientists	 and	 government	 officials	
throughout	 the	 period	 from	 1986	 (the	 time	 of	 first	 diagnosis	 in	 cattle)	 to	 1995	 (when	 vCJD	was	 first	 observed	












partly	because	of	 the	economic	harm	 this	knowledge	would	cause	 the	UK	beef	 industry	and	partly	because	of	
failures	in	institutional	capacities	and	procedures
Regulation of the artificial sweetener saccharin 
















theory	 that	saccharin	caused	cancer	 in	humans.	An	extensive	 review	by	 the	 International	Agency	 for	Research	
on	Cancer	concluded	 that	 “there	 is	no	consistent	evidence	 that	 the	 risk	of	cancer	 is	 increased	among	users	of	
saccharin”	[IARC,	1982	cited	in	Chappel,	1994].	The	mechanism	by	which	large	doses	of	saccharin	cause	cancer	
in	rats	 is	unlikely	to	be	relevant	to	 low-dose	human	exposures	[Ellwein	and	Cohen,	1990]	and,	 in	2000,	the	US	
removed	 saccharin	 from	 its	 official	 list	 of	 carcinogens	 and	 repealed	 the	 law	 requiring	 warning	 labels	 on	 food	
[Graham,	2003].	
B2 Designing effective risk 
management strategies 
Failure to design risk management strategies 
that adequately balance alternatives
Successful	 risk	 management	 requires	 setting	 an	
objective,	designing	a	strategy	to	reach	the	objective,	
and	 planning	 and	 acting	 to	 implement	 this	 strategy.	
Deficits	will	be	found,	for	example,	when	there	is	(a)	no	
clear	objective,	(b)	no	adequate	risk	strategy,	or	(c)	no	
appropriate	 risk	 policy,	 regulation	 or	 implementation	
plan.	When	 there	 are	 two	 or	 more	 objectives	 (e.g.,	
economic	 prosperity	 and	 environmental	 protection),	
deficits	 can	 arise	 from	 a	 preoccupation	 with	 one	
objective	to	the	exclusion	of	the	other.	
In	 both	 the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors,	 it	 is	 the	 risk	
manager’s	 task	 to	 design	 and	 implement	 effective	
policies	and	strategic	decisions.	That	task	is	not	easy	




relating	 to	 electromagnetic	 fields,	 the	 decision	 by	
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due	 to	 missed	 business	 opportunities	 and	 potential	
long-term	liability	risks.	Regardless	of	the	nature	of	the	
risk,	effectiveness	 implies	an	explicit	 goal	 (or	goals)	
for	risk	management,	including	systems	for	measuring	
progress	 towards	 the	 goal	 once	 risk	 management	
decisions	 are	 implemented.	 It	 is	 not	 only	 the	 public	
sector	which	must	develop	effective	strategies	for	risk	
management.	Whether	 as	 the	 result	 of	 government	
regulation,	product	liability	and	personal	injury	laws	or	
the	need	to	manage	risk	as	part	of	a	broader	approach	
to	 portfolio	 management,	 businesses	 also	 need	 to	
set	 and	 implement	 risk	management	 strategies	 that	




















of	 novel	 risks	 could	 be	 done	 through	 the	 use	 of	
instruments	such	as	containment,	which	may	limit	the	
use	of	 a	 new	 technology	 (or	 practice)	 in	 space	and	
time	 to	 gain	 more	 experience	 with	 uncertain	 risks	
and	 benefits.	 Regulation	 can	 then	 be	 revised	 on	 a	
dynamic	basis	according	to	the	results	of	evaluations.	
For	example,	 it	has	been	recommended	that	carbon	
capture	 and	 storage	 systems	 at	 coal-fired	 power	
plants	 be	 regulated	 in	 this	manner,	 in	 order	 both	 to	
minimise	 risks	and	 to	maximise	 the	 information	 that	
can	 be	 applied	 to	 later	 regulatory	 decisions.	 When	
regulatory	effectiveness	has	not	yet	been	measured	
or	 proven,	 an	 adaptive	 governance	 approach	 using	
flexible	and	resilient	strategies	may	be	advisable.
BSE in the United Kingdom 
- Heightened economic losses as a result of trying to protect both public heath and industrial interests.










The United States’ biofuels policy  









Recent	 studies	on	 the	environmental	 impacts	of	 biofuels	have	 called	 into	question	 the	
compatibility	of	the	three	policy	objectives.	The	widespread	production	and	use	of	corn-
based	ethanol	may	be	generating	more	 carbon	dioxide	emissions	 than	 the	petroleum-
based	products	that	are	being	replaced.	 In	this	case,	more	serious	analysis	 is	required	
to	 determine	 whether	 the	 objectives	 are	 conflicting	 and,	 if	 so,	 what	 the	 right	 balance	
should	be.	 In	 the	US,	 it	seems	 that	energy	security	and	agricultural	development	have	
overwhelmed	consideration	of	the	environment.			
B3 Considering a reasonable 
range of risk management 
options 
Failure to consider a reasonable range of risk 
management options (and their negative or 
positive consequences) in order to meet set 
objectives
A	 risk	 deficit	 occurs	 when,	 for	 reasons	 such	 as	
familiarity,	 prior	 use	 or	 time	 constraints,	 the	 risk	








As	more	 than	 one	 option	 is	 considered,	 a	 range	 of	
consequences	 (in	 addition	 to	 relative	 effectiveness)	
may	 be	 considered.	 Trade-offs	 between	 different	
consequences	(good	and	bad)	may	need	to	be	made.	
The	 manager	 should	 not	 necessarily	 pre-determine	
a	preference	for	one	outcome	over	the	other.	 It	may	
be	useful	to	perform	a	form	of	multi-criteria	analysis,	
where	 all	 the	 consequences	 (including	 financial,	




Protecting the safety of workers  
- Revising regulation to increase its effectiveness.
The	US	Occupational	Health	and	Safety	Administration	(OSHA)	began	operations	in	1971.	
One	of	OSHA’s	policy	objectives	was	to	reduce	the	rate	of	worker	injury	through	enforcement	
policies	 that	would	motivate	employers	and	employees	 to	adhere	 to	established	safety	
standards.	This	policy	objective	was	explicit,	measurable	by	injury	data	reported	to	OSHA	
by	firms	and	pursued	by	OSHA	through	a	policy	of	increased	frequency	of	inspections	at	
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When	 decisions	 must	 be	 made	 about	 whether	 an	
activity	needs	to	be	avoided	or	about	the	likelihood	that	
this	activity	is	unsafe,	scientific	studies	are	conducted,	
often	 leading	 to	 the	 identification	 of	 uncertainties	
or	 thresholds	 for	 the	 probability	 or	 likelihood	 that	
the	 activity	 is	 unsafe.	 For	 example,	 when	 these	










makers	 have	 neglected	 an	 entire	 set	 of	 risk	
management	options,	such	as	those	that	aim	to	build	
redundancies	and	 resilience	 into	systems	 that	might	
be	 exposed	 to	 unknown	 or	 uncertain	 threats.	 Such	
actions	 can	 reduce	 system	 vulnerabilities	 and	 allow	
for	 a	 quicker	 recovery	 after	 a	 hazardous	 event	 has	
occurred	 [IRGC,	2005].	Building	 redundancy	 is	 thus	
a	 risk	 management	 strategy	 which,	 by	 increasing	
resilience,	can	be	a	valid	approach	to	responding	to	
uncertain	 risks	and	should	be	among	 the	options	 to	
be	considered.
Fisheries management 
- Drawing from past experience when choosing risk management measures.
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The	pollock	fishery	in	Alaska	is	certified	as	sustainable	by	the	Marine	Stewardship	Council.	The	fishery	is	formed	
by	cooperatives	with	pre-set	quota	shares.	Although	 these	 rights	have	been	an	 incentive	 to	 increase	economic	
investments	and	gains,	 they	do	not	provide	sustainability	on	 their	own.	The	North	Pacific	Fishery	Management	




- Regulation as incentive or constraint – how different options influence industrial innovation.
Pesticides	are	 intentionally	 toxic,	which	calls	 for	 regulation	 to	ensure	 that	products	are	
safe,	effective	and	of	high	quality.	However,	regulation	can	itself	induce	other	types	of	risks	
because	it	may	constrain	innovation.	
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B4 Designing efficient and 
equitable risk management 
policies
Inappropriate risk management occurs when 
benefits and costs are not balanced in an 
efficient and equitable manner




the	 field	 of	 “welfare	 economics”,	 is	 maximisation	
of	 net	 benefits	 (benefits	 minus	 costs).	 In	 this	 strict	
form	 of	 benefit-cost	 analysis,	 the	 consequences	
of	 risk	 management	 measures	 are	 quantified	 and	






benefits	 and	 costs,	 including	 those	 affecting	 human	




When	 the	 key	 consequences	 of	 a	 measure	 cannot	
be	 quantified	 and	 expressed	 in	monetary	 units,	 the	
findings	 of	 a	 benefit-cost	 analysis	 are	 less	 clear;	
decision-makers	 must	 use	 judgement	 to	 weigh	 the	
unquantified	 –	 and	 sometimes	 intangible	 –	 benefits	
and	 costs.	 This	 process	 of	 weighing	 qualitative	 as	




effectiveness,	 is	 that	 uniform	 standards	 may	 be	





and-trade	programme	 to	 control	 carbon	dioxide,	 the	
Obama	 administration	 has	 recently	 proposed	 that	 a	








are	 employed	 to	 determine	 whether	 the	 distribution	
of	 winners	 and	 losers	 from	 risk	 management	 is	
acceptable.	
Applying	a	theory	of	“justice”	pioneered	by	the	Harvard	






more	 burdens	 than	 benefits	 on	 the	most	 vulnerable	
populations	 or	 the	 least	 advantaged	 members	 of	
society.	In	the	field	of	environmental	policy,	concepts	






the	 international	 community	 recognises	 that	 it	 is	
inequitable	for	citizens	of	developing	countries	to	pay	
the	costs	of	programmes	to	reduce	greenhouse	gas	
emissions	when	 it	was	 the	growth	of	 the	developed	
world	that	led	to	the	predicament	that	now	troubles	the	









their	 gains	 as	 deserved.	 It	 is	 therefore	 important	 to	
perform	 careful	 analysis	 of	 equity	 arguments	 even	
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evaluate	equity,	and	 justification	of	gains	and	 losses	
inherently	involves	some	degree	of	subjectivity.	













The Kyoto Protocol 
- Issues of efficiency and equity were central to concluding the Kyoto agreement on greenhouse gas emissions.
The	problem	of	equity	and	climate	change	is	two-fold.	The	rich,	developed	countries	have	produced	the	majority	of	
greenhouse	gas	emissions	and	have	special	responsibility	for	the	risks	the	entire	world	is	now	facing.	And	although	
all	 countries	will	 be	affected	by	climate	change,	 they	will	 be	affected	 in	different	ways	and	 to	different	extents.	


















B5 Implementing and enforcing 
risk management decisions 
Failure to muster the necessary will and 
resources to implement risk management 
policies and decisions
Designing	 wise	 risk	 management	 policies	 is	 only	
part	 of	 the	 challenge.	 Real-world	 implementation	 is	
another	 critical	 issue.	 If	 the	 policies	 are	 voluntary,	
there	must	be	some	system	of	follow-through,	where	
the	performance	of	participating	parties	 is	monitored	
to	 determine	 whether	 voluntary	 agreements	 have	
been	honoured;	 there	must	also	be	a	mechanism	to	
ensure	 that	 complying	companies	are	not	penalised	
by	 non-complying	 competitors	 not	 bearing	 the	
costs	 of	 compliance.	 If	 the	 policy	 is	 legally	 binding	
(e.g.,	 a	 mandatory	 regulation	 on	 the	 behaviours	 of	
businesses	or	individuals),	deficits	in	implementation	
can	occur	if	violators	of	binding	rules	are	not	detected	
and	punished	appropriately.	 In	 other	words,	 policies	
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may	be	perfectly	conceived	and	formulated,	and	well-
adapted	 to	a	particular	 risk,	and	 regulations	may	be	
well-balanced,	 but	 little	will	 be	 accomplished	 if	 they	
are	not	implemented	and	enforced.
There	 are	 sometimes	 perverse	 incentives	 for	
policymakers	 to	 create	 risk	 management	 policies	
that	 are	 not	 implemented.	 Policymakers	 may	 wish	
to	 be	 seen	 as	 “acting”	 when	 in	 fact	 they	 lack	 the	
resources,	 time	or	organisational	capacity	 to	ensure	
implementation.	 In	 some	 cases,	 policies	 may	 be	
implemented	 only	 symbolically,	 and	 implementation	
may	 be	 (quietly)	 taken	 for	 granted	 and	 not	 even	
monitored.
BSE in the United Kingdom













Fisheries depletion: Mediterranean bluefin tuna
- Ignored fishing quotas have led to serious depletion of fish stocks.
The	Mediterranean	tuna	fishery	has	one	of	the	highest	levels	of	overfishing	in	the	world.	It	is	fished	by	11	Mediterranean	
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B6 Anticipating side effects of 
risk management 
Failure to anticipate, monitor and react to the 
outcomes of a risk management decision in 
the case of negative side effects
Changes	 in	one	part	of	a	complex	system	can	have	
an	 impact	 on	 and	 beyond	 the	 other	 components	 of	
the	 system.	 Successful	 risk	 management	 requires	
anticipation	 of	 both	 the	 intended	 and	 unintended	
consequences	 of	 decisions.	 For	 example,	 well-




on	 environmental	 quality.	 Similarly,	 biofuel	 policies	




A	corollary	of	 this	governance	deficit	 is	 the	 frequent	
failure	to	monitor the	effects	of	decisions,	not	just	for	





and	 evaluation	 of	 policies,	 the	 proper	 design	 and	
implementation	of	contingency	plans	can	be	expected	
to	suffer.	
Monitoring the use of clozapine







acute,	 severe	and	dangerous	decrease	 in	 the	number	of	white	 blood	 cells),	with	 eight	
subsequently		dying	[Naheed	and	Green,	2000].		The		manufacturer	of	the	drug,	Sandoz,	
subsequently	 withdrew	 the	 product	 from	 the	 market,	 judging	 the	 risks	 (1-2%	 risk	 of	 agranulocytosis,	 and	 the	
company’s	associated	liability)	to	be	too	high.	
Because	clozapine	had	been	shown	to	be	extremely	effective	against	conventional	treatment-resistant	schizophrenia,	
ameliorating	 symptoms	 and	 decreasing	 the	 suicide	 mortality	 rate,	 there	 was	 pressure	 from	 psychiatrists	 to	
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B7 Reconciling time horizons
An inability to reconcile the time frame of the 
risk with the time frames of decision-making 
and incentive schemes   
As	 mentioned	 in	 the	 introduction	 to	 this	 section,	
business	 and	 politics	 are	 often	 dominated	 by	 short-
term	considerations.	Yet	risk	issues	have	a	variety	of	
time	profiles.	Some	become	apparent	only	after	a	long	
period	 of	 time	 (e.g.,	 chronic	 disease	 after	 a	 certain	
latency	 period),	 some	 strike	 suddenly	 with	 various	
degrees	 of	 warning	 (natural	 disasters),	 some	 start	
slowly	 but	may	escalate	 rapidly	 in	 epidemic	 fashion	











Arguably	 the	most	pervasive	deficit	 is	a	 tendency	 to	
ignore	 long-term	 risks	and	costs	 relative	 to	 the	day-
to-day	needs	 that	seem	 to	be	–	and	sometimes	are	
–	 urgent.	 A	 related	 tendency	 is	 to	 look	 for	 simple	
“quick	fixes”	to	complicated,	long-term	challenges	that	
may	require	fundamental	changes	in	public	attitudes,	
behaviours	 and	 institutions	 (e.g.,	 sustainability	 and	
climate	change).		
CFCs and ozone depletion
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Asbestos
- Long-term health damage and costs to industry from asbestos-related disease were incurred because of the short-term 
orientation of policymakers in industry and government.
In	the	UK,	accounts	of	asbestos-related	health	hazards	were	recorded	as	early	as	1898	
and	 the	 first	 dust	 control,	 medical	 surveillance	 and	 compensation	 regulations	 in	 the	
world	were	introduced	in	1931.	Unfortunately,	these	rules	were	only	partially	enforced	as	















The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change
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B8 Balancing transparency and 
confidentiality
Failure to balance two of the necessary 
requirements     of    decision-making:   trans-
parency, which can foster stakeholder trust, 
and confidentiality, which can protect security 
and maintain incentives for innovation
When	 communicating	 information	 about	 the	 risk	
issue	and	 the	decisions	 taken	on	how	to	manage	 it,	
the	need	for	either	transparency	or	confidentiality	will	
vary.	An	excessive	focus	on	confidentiality	may	reduce	
trust	 in	 risk	management	and	 in	decision-makers	by	
raising	 suspicion	 that	 the	 shield	 of	 confidentiality	 is	
being	 used	 as	 a	 power	 lever	 (e.g.,	 by	 government	
and/or	 industry)	 to	 advance	 or	 protect	 particular	
interests	without	adequate	 justification.	On	the	other	
hand,	 excessive	 transparency	 may	 not	 respect	 the	
need	to	protect	 legitimate	 interests	(e.g.,	 the	privacy	
interests	 of	 individual	 citizens).	 For	 example,	 a	
citizen’s	 desire	 to	 keep	 his	 or	 her	 health	 records	
confidential	 is	 a	 legitimate	 claim	 of	 confidentiality	 in	
many	societies.	Likewise,	 the	protection	of	business	
secrets	in	competitive	markets,	where	innovations	can	
be	 the	 subject	 of	 piracy,	 is	 also	 seen	 as	 necessary	
for	 a	well-functioning,	 innovative	 economy.	And,	 the	




however,	 is	 towards	 more	 release	 of	 data,	 more	
transparent	 reporting	 and	 fuller	 accountability,	 while	
maintaining	 some	 confidentiality	 under	 compelling	
circumstances.	 Terrorism	 is	 a	 relevant	 example.	




which	 includes	 the	 promise	 to	 give	 an	 “appropriate”	
answer	to	the	public	in	all	situations:
Government	 will	 make	 available	 its	 assessments	
of	 risks	 that	 affect	 the	 public,	 how	 it	 has	 reached	
its	 decisions,	 and	 how	 it	 will	 handle	 the	 risk.	 […]	
When	 information	has	 to	be	kept	private,	or	where	







The	 recent	 emphasis	 on	 greater	 transparency	 in	
communication	perhaps	reflects	lessons	learned	from	
past	 experiences	 where	 inadequate	 communication	
and	 explanation	 of	 risk	 management	 decisions	 led	
to	 negative	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 this	 occurred	
during	 the	 handling	 of	 the	BSE	 epidemic	 in	 the	UK	
over	 the	 period	 1986-96.	 In	 this	 case,	 there	 was	
a	 disproportionate	 emphasis	 on	 confidentiality	 in	
order	 to	 protect	 the	 interests	 of	 industry	 and	 avoid	
public	 panic,	 which	 ultimately	 led	 to	 the	 risks	 being	
downplayed.	 This	 resulted	 in	 a	 serious	 erosion	 of	
public	trust	in	the	government.
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B9 Organisational capacity
Failure to build or maintain an adequate 
organisational capacity to manage risk
Effective	 risk	 management	 depends	 on	 people	 and	
organisations	 that	 can	 mobilise	 resources,	 build	
consensus	 and	 translate	 ideas	 into	 practical	 risk	
policies.	Such	managerial	effectiveness	relies	upon	an	




“skills”	 and	 “capabilities”	 [IRGC,	 2005].	 Assets	
include	 knowledge,	 financial	 and	 human	 resources,	
organisational	 structures	 and	 processes,	 and	 the	
organisational	 integration	 that	 deploys	 these	 assets	
most	effectively.	Skills	are	the	ability	of	organisations	
and	 their	 managers	 and	 staff	 to	 adapt	 their	 assets	
to	 deal	with	 changing	 and	often	 dynamic	 situations.	
Capabilities	 constitute	 the	 framework	 in	 which	 the	
assets	 and	 skills	 can	 be	 best	 exploited,	 including	
the	network	within	which	an	organisation	cooperates	











accounting	practices	had	allowed	 it	 to	hide	 in	off-balance-sheet	overseas	entities.	This,	
combined	with	 its	use	of	 “mark	 to	market”	accounting	 (where	projected	 future	earnings	
from	 long-term	 contracts	 were	 treated	 as	 current	 income),	 greatly	 inflated	 its	 reported	
earnings,	so	that	its	sudden	bankruptcy	shocked	the	market.		The	lack	of	transparency	in
Enron’s	accounting	and	auditing	was	one	of	 the	major	 failures	of	corporate	governance	 implicated	 in	 the	Enron	
scandal,	offering	an	example	of	using	financial	innovations	within	modern	corporations	to	an	extent	that	is	neither	
sustainable	nor	ethical	[Dembinski,	2006].
The subprime crisis in the United States
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despite	both	the	controversies	created	when	risks	are	
managed	 explicitly	 and	 the	 costs	 that	 preventative	
measures	 may	 represent,	 with	 no	 direct	 return	 on	
expenditure.	 Such	 a	 culture	 must	 show	 awareness	
of	 risk	 and	 its	 consequences,	 and	 be	 supportive	 of	
responding	adequately	to	risks	even	during	the	early	
stages	of	their	development.
Organisations	 with	 a	 sophisticated	 approach	 to	
risk	 governance	 also	 recognise	 the	 importance	 of	
communicating	and	consulting	with	stakeholders,	and	
know	which	methods	of	stakeholder	involvement	are	





of	 “organisation”	 to	 include	 stakeholders	 within	 risk	





- A well-intentioned reorganisation to combat terrorism curtailed a federal agency’s capacity to respond to natural 
disaster.
After	 9/11,	 the	US	Federal	Emergency	Management	Agency	 (FEMA)	was	 reorganised	
to	become	a	part	of	the	new	Department	of	Homeland	Security	(DHS).	Because	of	the	
heightened	focus	on	terrorism,	FEMA	had	its	powers	and	resources	downgraded	as	DHS	






Health-care workers and the Toronto SARS outbreak








health-care	 facility.	Overlooking	 the	 “critical	need	 to	 listen	 to	nurses	and	other	healthcare	workers	and	 to	more	
effectively	communicate	with	 them	 in	hospital	and	other	settings”	significantly	compromised	efforts	 to	bring	 the	
SARS	 crisis	 under	 control	 [Campbell	 et	 al.,	 2004].	 Important	 decisions	 concerning	 health-care	 workers,	 such	
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B10 Dealing with dispersed 
responsibilities 
Failure of the multiple departments or organi-





or	 one	 entity	 has	 conflicting	 responsibilities.	
Overlapping,	 shared	 or	 unclear	 responsibilities,	with	
poor	communication	and	cooperation,	can	mean	that	
important	 decisions	 will	 not	 be	 taken	 or	 will	 not	 be	
implemented.	
Governments	 and	 large	 corporations	 tend	 to	 create	
fragmentation	 in	 risk	management	 through	 complex	
and	 compartmentalised	 organisations.	 They	 often	
create	separate	functional	groups	that	generate	“silo	
thinking”	about	risk	(e.g.,	one	unit	concentrates	on	air	
pollution,	 another	 on	 water	 pollution,	 and	 so	 forth).	
Although	fragmentation	serves	some	useful	purposes	
(e.g.,	specialisation	of	labour),	it	invites	unproductive	
situations	 where	 no	 one	 has	 accountability	 for	 the	




Dispersed	 responsibilities	 occur	 when	 actors	 at	




and/or	 government	 work	 together.	 They	 may	 also	
occur	 when	 government,	 business	 and	 civil	 society	
have	different,	potentially	overlapping	responsibilities,	
as	for	example	in	the	electricity	sector,	where	different	




Within	 organisational	 structures,	 different	 ministries	
or	 different	 operating	 companies	of	 the	 same	group	




Dispersed	 responsibilities	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 prevalent	

















responsible	 for	 decisions	 and	 policies.	 Finding	 the	







- The division of responsibilities between countries and companies created challenges that complicated risk governance.
The	efficient	and	secure	transmission	of	electricity	between	many	European	countries	relies	on	cooperation	between	
separate,	 independent	 transmission	 service	operators	 (TSOs)	 and	 their	 compliance	with	 standards	established	
by	 the	 Union	 for	 the	 Coordination	 of	 Transmission	 of	 Electricity	 (UCTE).	 The	 responsibility	 for	 managing	 the	
interconnected	European	electricity	network	is	therefore	shared	between	the	TSOs.
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responses	 from	other	European	system	operators	 in	order	 to	quarantine	 the	effects	of	 the	outage	 [IEA/OECD,	
2005].
Subsequent	investigations	of	the	blackout	found	that	the	underlying	problems	that	led	to	the	incident	were	largely	
a	 result	 of	 how	 responsibilities	 for	 cross-border	 exchanges	 of	 electricity	 were	 shared	 between	 TSOs.	 They	
recommended	improved	coordination	between	the	TSOs	(including	joint	operator-training	programmes)	and	better	
compliance	with	UCTE	 standards,	which	 should	 become	 legally	 binding	 [SFOE,	 2003;	UCTE,	 2004;	CRE	and	
AEEG,	2004].
BSE in the United Kingdom
- Assigning the same ministry responsibility for both industry promotion and risk management invites management 
deficits.
The	UK	Ministry	of	Agriculture,	Fisheries	and	Food	(MAFF)	was	responsible	for	promoting	
the	 economic	 interests	 of	 the	 agricultural	 community	 –	 in	 this	 case	 the	 cattle	 farmers,	
abattoirs	and	 renderers	–	as	well	as	dealing	with	matters	 related	 to	 food	safety.	Given	
the	heavy	influence	of	the	industries	involved,	risk	management	might	have	been	more	
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B11 Dealing with commons 
problems and externalities 
A lack of understanding of the complex nature 
of commons problems and consequently also 
of the specific risk management tools required 
to address them 
The	 term	 “commons”	applies	 to	goods	or	 resources	
to	which	all	members	of	a	community	have	rights	or	
access.	 The	 so-called	 “Tragedy	 of	 the	 Commons”	
[Hardin,	1968]	describes	a	dilemma	in	which	multiple	
individuals	 acting	 independently	 in	 their	 own	 self-
interest	 can	 ultimately	 destroy	 a	 shared	 resource	
even	 though	 it	 is	 in	 their	 joint	 long-term	 interest	 to	
preserve	 it.	 Given	 that	 many	 common	 resources	






of	 cross-border	 issues	 with	 more	 complicated	
management	concerns.
Common	goods	 or	 resources	may	 fall	 under	 a	 very	
limited	system	of	property	rights,	or	such	a	system	may	
be	absent.	One	example	of	assigning	property	rights	
to	 a	 common	 property	 resource	 is	 the	 development	
of	“cap	and	trade”	schemes	to	control	the	amount	of	
carbon	dioxide	(and	other	greenhouse	gases)	emitted	
into	 the	 atmosphere.	Managing	 commons	 problems	
can	 be	 difficult	 because	 the	 protection	 of	 global	
commons	 often	 demands	 relinquishing	 short-term	
economic	or	other	benefits	in	exchange	for	protection	
of	shared	resources.	Other	solutions	to	the	commons	




established,	 free-riders	 avoided	 and	 the	 sustainable	
Hurricane Katrina
- Confusion of responsibilities between federal, state and local responders.
The	multi-level	 nature	 of	 crisis	 response	 in	 the	US	 assumes	 a	 gradual	 expansion	 of	 government	 involvement	













The	 network	 of	 responders	 also	 includes	 NGOs,	 and	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognise	 the	 additional	 challenge	 of	
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yield	per	user	clearly	defined,	such	arrangements	can	
be	both	very	effective	and	efficient.
When	 commons	 problems	 entail	 cross-border	 or	
planet-wide	 impacts,	 international	 cooperation	 is	
generally	 required	 for	 effective	 management.	 Such	
cooperation	 is	 notoriously	 difficult	 to	 achieve	 but	
attempts	are	being	made	(e.g.,	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	
the	UNFCCC	 and	 the	UN	Convention	 on	Biological	
Diversity).	 The	 uneven	 or	 ineffectual	 experience	 of	
international	 agreements	 has	 demonstrated	 how	
difficult	it	is	to	deal	with	commons	problems.
The Montreal Protocol
























The Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation scheme
- Using financial incentives as a tool to address a commons problem.
Forests	play	an	important	role	in	the	global	carbon	budget,	acting	either	as	sinks	or	sources	of	CO2	emissions.	The	
effects	vary	globally	as	a	result	of	differences	in	soil,	tree	type,	tree	cover	and	other	factors.	Deforestation	(which	




international risk governance councilRisk Governance Deficits
B12 Managing conflicts of 
interests, beliefs, values and 
ideologies 
A conflict may be negotiable or irreconcilable, 
and risk managers must have the capacity to 
distinguish between the two
Management	of	 risk	 is	not	a	purely	 technical	 task;	 it	
may	entail	accepting	or	seeking	to	resolve	fundamental	
conflicts	 between	 individuals,	 societal	 groups,	
businesses	 and	 governments.	 Broadly	 speaking,	
those	 conflicts	 may	 relate	 to	 differing	 interests	 that	









at	 risk?”,	 “what	are	 the	priorities	 for	 response?”	and	
“whose	 priorities	 are	 these?”	 are	 not	made	 clear	 or	
are	the	subject	of	disagreement.
The	 underlying	 motives	 that	 drive	 conflict	 may	
be	 exaggerated	 by	 the	 concerns	 or	 personalities	
of	 particular	 leaders,	 including	 the	 varying	 levels	
of	 trust	 that	 people	 have	 in	 them,	 as	 well	 as	 by	
how	 comfortable	 people	 are	 with	 the	 processes	 of	
negotiation,	compromise	and	compensation.
Confusion	about	the	underlying	motives	of	protagonists	
can	 occur.	 For	 example,	 advocates	 with	 a	 material	
interest	 in	 the	 issue	may	 represent	 their	 position	as	
rooted	in	a	philosophical	principle	that	cannot	possibly	
be	 compromised.	 Likewise,	 decision-makers	 may	
dismiss	 or	 even	 disbelieve	 a	 stakeholder’s	 honest	
claim	 that	 a	 concern	 flows	 from	 adherence	 to	 an	
unusual	 religious	 or	 ethical	 belief.	 It	 may	 therefore	
be	 a	 challenge	 for	 the	 risk	 manager	 to	 accurately	
determine	 what	 the	 motives	 of	 stakeholders	 are.	






































Conflicts	 with	 different	 motivations	 may	 require	
different	 pathways	 to	 resolution.	 If	 the	 automobile	
and	oil	 industries	have	different	material	 interests	 in	
how	a	risk	is	managed	(as,	perhaps,	with	the	current	
goal	 for	 the	 automobile	 industry	 to	 build	 cars	which	
use	 less	 petrol	 and	 diesel),	 it	 may	 be	 feasible	 to	











governance	 can	 occur	when	 decision-makers	 fail	 to	
understand	 the	 motives	 of	 conflicting	 stakeholders,	
misapply	the	many	tools	of	conflict	resolution	or	treat	a	
conflict	as	negotiable	when,	in	fact,	it	is	irresolvable.
The Canadian asbestos industry
- Canada has not successfully reconciled conflicting interests related to human health with its economic, political and social 
interests in the asbestos industry.










in	 2007,	 has	 “an	 almost	 sacred	 status	 in	 the	 province,”	 which	 has	 “made	 it	 politically	 untouchable”,	 especially	
since	support	 from	Quebec	 is	essential	 for	any	political	party	wishing	 to	 form	a	majority	government	 in	Canada	
[Economist,	2008;	Howse	and	Tuerk,	2001].	
Canada	 challenged	 France’s	 ban	 on	 asbestos	 (including	 imports)	 at	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organization	in	1998,	but	lost	its	case	when	a	panel	decided	that	France’s	actions	were	
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B13 Acting in the face of the 
unexpected 
Insufficient flexibility in the face of unexpected 
risk situations
As	 in	 the	 failure	 to	 imagine	 surprises	 (A10),	 risk	
managers	 may	 be	 unable	 to	 act	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	
unexpected.	This	risk	governance	deficit	occurs	when	
people	 and	 organisations	 are	 not	 prepared	 or	 able	




to	 dealing	 with	 today’s	 risks	 may	 prove	 inadequate	
tomorrow	 when	 new	 threats,	 abrupt	 change	 and	
paradigm	shifts	 fundamentally	 transform	 the	context	
within	which	risks	must	be	managed.	Here,	the	deficit	
may	arise	because	risk	managers	delay	 the	change	
from	 routine	 to	 crisis	management	 or	 because	 they	





especially	 the	 encouragement	 of	 unconventional	
Even	at	home,	Canada	has	been	unable	to	properly	address	asbestos-related	health	risks	because	of	this	conflict	of	
interests.	There	was	no	asbestos	dust	standard	in	place	in	Quebec	until	1978	and,	even	since	then,	the	occupational	
exposure	 limit	 for	 chrysotile	 asbestos	 has	 remained	 ten	 times	higher	 than	 the	generally	 accepted	 international	
standard	[Brophy	et	al.,	2007].	
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict













and	war	 that	 have	 repeatedly	broken	out	between	 the	 two	parties.	After	UN	Resolution	181	 failed	disastrously	
by	trying	to	impose	a	rational,	yet	perhaps	simplistic,	solution,	later	efforts	focussed	on	mediation	and	promoting	
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thinking	 and	 innovation,	 plus	 the	 capacity	 to	 make	
decisions	 in	 situations	 of	 aleatory	 uncertainty6.	
Processes	 are	 needed	 that	 generate	 insights	 and	
ideas	 situated	 on	 the	 margins	 of	 current	 thinking	
and	 that	 challenge	 conventional	 wisdom	 to	 imagine	






When	 unexpected	 events	 occur,	 professionals	 who	
deviate	 from	 mainstream	 opinion	 and	 advocate	
outsider	 positions	 are	 often	 denounced	 as	
troublemakers	and	ignored,	or	even	demoted	instead	










mainstream	 thinking	 by	 poorly	 supported	 lateral	
thinking.	 Thus,	 openness	 to	 new	 ideas	 must	 be	
accompanied	 by	 rigorous	 scrutiny	 of	 those	 ideas.	 It	
is	also	important	to	realise	that	we	will	never	be	able	
to	predict	and	be	prepared	for	all	future	outcomes,	no	
matter	how	 thorough	and	able	our	 foresight,	and,	 in	
such	circumstances,	readiness	and	ability	to	change	
routine	procedures	become	more	important.
Where	 there	 is	a	need	 to	deal	with	 the	unexpected,	
including	 sudden	 change	 associated	 with	 emerging	
risks,	 decision-makers	 may	 neglect,	 or	 refuse	 to	
acknowledge,	 such	 risks.	 Denial	 may	 be	 especially	
problematic	 if	 economic,	 political	 or	 environmental	
systems	are	about	to	change	or	are	already	changing,	
and	thus	new	approaches	are	needed.	
Risk	 management	 failures	 can	 also	 arise	 when	
decision-makers	have	neglected	to	build	redundancies	
and	 resilience	 into	 systems	 that	 might	 be	 exposed	
to	 unknown	 or	 uncertain	 threats,	 or	 when	 they	 are	






components	 of	 a	 risk	 management	 strategy	 which,	






- Failure to respond adequately owing to the huge and unexpected scale of the destruction. 
Although	Hurricane	Katrina	itself	was	not	an	unexpected	event	–	meteorologists	had	been	






















is	 one	 of	 those	which	 took	 the	matter	 extremely	 seriously,	 passing	 the	Year	 2000	 Information	 and	Readiness	




Actions	 taken	 to	 remedy	 possible	 Y2K	 problems	 did	 have	 some	 benefits.	 With	 many	
businesses	 installing	 computer	 backup	 systems	 for	 critical	 files,	 preparation	 for	 Y2K	









Need for early warning systems (A1)
Understanding: Assessing risks
Need to acquire and 
develop knowledge
What to achieve with 
good risk assessment?
How to achieve good 
risk assessment?
Objective and criteria for 
good risk assessment:
Need to get factual knowledge (A2) Need to get knowledge about perceptions (A3)
Involving stakeholders (A4)
Using formal models (A9)
Assessing potential surprises (A10)
The acceptability of the risk must 
be evaluated (A5)
Misinterpretation of information 
must be avoided (A6)
Complex systems need to be 
understood (A7)
Rapid or fundamental changes in 
systems must be recognised (A8)
Allocation	of	deficits	to	the	left	or	right	side	of	this	chart	may	be	subject	to	interpretation,	but	intends,	here,	to	focus	on	the	main	characteristics	of	
each	deficit.	A10	in	particular	could	be	considered	to	include	elements	of	both	objectives	and	criteria.
Tools/capability to conduct 
adequate risk assessment:
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IV How to work with the risk governance deficits as  







Responding to early warnings (B1)








What to achieve with 
good risk management?
How to achieve good 
risk management?
Objective and criteria for 
effective risk management:
Tools/capabilities that decision-
makers must use/develop for 
making good decisions:
Organisational capacity (B9)
Risk management policies must be 
efficient and equitable (B4)
Dealing with dispersed 
responsibilities (B10)
Side effects of risk management 
must be anticipated (B6)
Managing fundamental conflicts (B12)
Time horizons must be 
reconciled (B7)
Developing the capacity to act in 
the event of the unexpected (B13)
Transparency and confidentiality 
must be balanced (B8)
Commons problems and externalities 
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IRGC	has	 identified	 the	23	deficits	described	 in	 this	
report	 as	 important	 because	 of	 their	 propensity	 to	
recur	frequently	and	to	have	an	impact	on	the	effective	
governance	 of	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 risk	 types	 in	 many	
varying	 contexts	 and	 circumstances,	 with	 potential	
severe	consequences.	It	is	apparent	that	deficits	are	
interrelated;	that	multiple	deficits	are	often	implicated	
in	 the	 governance	 of	 a	 single	 risk	 issue;	 that	 one	
deficit	may	occur	 in	a	variety	of	different	ways;	and,	








Diagnosis	 and	 remedy	 of	 deficits	 is	 not	 a	 one-time	
event,	 but	 rather	 an	 ongoing	 process	 of	 finding	
problems	 and	 fixing	 them.	 The	 work	 done	 in	 the	
course	of	this	project	on	risk	governance	deficits	has	
highlighted	the	importance	of	the	interactive processes	
between	 risk	 assessment	 and	 management,	 and	
between	risk	generators	and	those	who	are	affected	
by	risks.	




the	 risk,	 as	 well	 as	 in	 accepting	 the	 decision	 and	
implementing	 it.	 Deciding	 which	 stakeholders	 to	
involve	and	how	is	often	a	very	difficult	and	delicate	
task.
Interactions	 between	 some	 stakeholders	 –	 industry,	
regulators	 and	 the	 public	 –	 also	 have	 the	 power	 to	
determine	 innovation	 outcomes,	 whether	 through	
encouragement	 or	 constraint.	 As	 highlighted	 in	 the	
introduction	 to	 this	 report,	 the	 inability	 to	 take	 full	
advantage	 of	 the	 benefits	 that	 innovation,	 whether	
technological	 or	 social,	 could	 bring	 to	 society	 is	 an	
important	 potential	 consequence	 of	 risk	 governance	
deficits.	





of	 the	 risk.	 Often,	 it	 is	 particularly	 challenging	 to	
identify	which	actors	are	responsible for the risk	and	
which	actors	generate	the	risk,	know	about	it,	control	
its	 assessment	 and	 management	 and,	 eventually,	
“own”	the	risk,	thus	receiving	credit	for	its	efficient	and	
fair	management.	The	melamine-tainted	milk	scandal	
in	China	 in	2008	demonstrated	 that	 food	safety	can	
become	 an	 important	 challenge	 in	 globalised	 food	
markets,	with	 responsibility	 for	 the	 risk	being	shifted	
away	 from	 the	 risk	generator	 (Chinese	producers	of	
milk	products)	to	others	(food-safety	regulators	or	the	
general	public).
In	 other	 situations,	 risk	 governance	 may	 falter	 not	
because	of	anything	to	do	with	stakeholder	roles,	but	
rather	because	of	a	 fundamental	 lack of knowledge,	
unknowability	or	ignorance	surrounding	the	risk	issue.	
Making	a	decision	under	such	circumstances	is	a	task	
that	 many	 decision-makers	 face	 regularly,	 and	 the	
examples	of	“policy	ahead	of	science”	are	many.
Particularly	 challenging	 are	 the	 rapidly	 changing	
environments	 within	 which	 risk	 governance	 takes	
place:	 the	many	 important	 changes	occurring	 in	 the	
various	scientific	and	technological	fields	and	the	way	
society	 becomes	 involved	 in	 consumer	 and	 political	
debates,	or	in	economic	and	social	regulation.
What’s	 more,	 in	 risk	 governance	 practice,	 knowing	
what should	 be	 done	 is	 one	 thing	 (and	 this	 in	 itself	
is	not	always	evident),	but	knowing	how it	should	be	
done	and	being	able	to	do	it	are	additional	challenges.	
People	may	 know	what	 the	 goal	 should	 be,	 but	 not	
how	to	achieve	it,	or	they	may	know	how	to	achieve	
it	 but	 are	 unable	 or	 unwilling	 to	 do	 so	 because	 of	
organisational	constraints	or	incompatible	incentives.	
V Conclusion and outlook
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organisations,	 and	 to	 reflect	 upon	how	such	deficits	
can	be	avoided	so	that	trust	is	built	into	how	the	risks	
are	dealt	with	and	in	who	deals	with	them.	
Further	 feedback	 from	 risk	 practitioners	 on	 the	
usefulness	or	relevance	of	this	report	is	welcomed.
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A: Assessing and understanding risks
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Cluster/sub-cluster Deficit Short description Illustrations
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EMF: Mobile phones and power lines  
By Leeka Kheifets, John Swanson and Shaiela Kandel
Power-frequency	electric	and	magnetic	fields	(EMFs)	have	been	present	in	industrialised	
countries	 since	 public	 electricity	 supplies	 appeared	 in	 the	 late	 19th	 century,	 while	 the	










Overview of the risk issue
EMFs	are	physical	fields	produced	by	the	interaction	between	the	charges	of	electrically	charged	objects.	EMFs	
have	varying	frequencies	and	intensities.	High-frequency	fields	that	carry	energy	sufficient	to	break	bonds	between	
molecules	 (such	as	X-rays	and	gamma	rays)	are	called	 ionising	 radiation	and	are	known	 to	be	carcinogenic	 to	










For	 radio-frequency	EMFs,	 the	epidemiological	 evidence	of	 health	 effects	 is	 sparse	and	uninformative:	 studies	
of	children	and	of	many	specific	diseases	are	lacking,	exposure	assessment	is	still	immature	and	the	technology	





evidence	 that	nonetheless	causes	public	concern.	For	 radio-frequency	EMFs,	 it	 is	 the	combination	of	 the	 rapid	
growth	of	new	exposures	over	a	relatively	short	time,	little	scientific	evidence	but	large	potential	consequences,	and	
significant	public	concern	that	may	lead	to	risk	governance	deficits.	
Annex: Case studies (Summaries)
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(B3);	or,	 conversely,	 those	advocating	certain	policy	options	may	 fail	 to	 recognise	 that	 these	policies	can	have	
consequences	(B6).	To	give	examples,	 for	power-frequency	EMFs,	where	one	major	source	 is	 the	high-voltage	
power	 line,	 there	 are	 a	 set	 of	 inter-related	 issues	 about	 land	 use	 and	 land	 values	 adjacent	 to	 such	 lines:	 the	
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action.	 No	 regulator	 or,	 even	 less,	 politician,	 wants	 to	 be	 seen	 to	 be	 lagging	 behind	 in	 public	 protection.	 This	
can	 lead	 to	a	 “race	 to	 the	bottom”	where	 the	measures	 taken	can	become	disconnected	 from	scientific	 reality.	














of	man-made	 levees	 that	were	supposed	 to	protect	 the	city	of	New	Orleans.	The	direct	
costs		of		repairs		and		reconstruction		plus	the		damage	caused		to	the	national	economic
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7)		The	Lake	Pontchartrain	and	Vicinity,	Louisiana	Hurricane	Protection	Project	in	the	Flood	Control	Act	of	1965	was	an	incomplete	project	already	
more	than	40	years	in	the	making	when	Katrina	hit	[GAO,	2005].
a) Failure to respond to the threat









heading	 to	New	Orleans	at	 11	a.m.	 on	Friday.	By	4	 p.m.	 the	 storm	was	predicted	 to	 hit	 the	Mississippi	 coast.	
By	4	a.m.	on	Saturday	New	Orleans	was	again	expected	to	be	hit.	On	that	day,	voluntary	evacuations	began	in	
Louisiana,	President	Bush	declared	a	state	of	emergency	and	FEMA	and	state	emergency	responders	began	24-









b) Failure to adequately respond to the damage caused
But	even	as	 the	needs	created	by	Katrina	became	clear,	 the	sheer	scope	of	 the	disaster	challenged	an	all-out	
response	effort.	A	catastrophe	so	 large	 requires	more	of	everything,	especially	 resources	and	 responders,	and	
































(A7)	and	more	successful	management	of	 related	 risk	 factors,	both	 in	 terms	of	prevention	and	 response	 (A10,	
B1,	B2,	B9,	B13),	would	have	minimised	some	of	the	losses	caused	by	Katrina.	Nevertheless,	any	consideration	
of	Katrina	must	acknowledge	 that	 the	 impact	of	Katrina	was	great	not	primarily	because	of	human	 failures,	but	
because	of	the	size	and	scope	of	the	task.		
Fisheries depletion and collapse 
By Kjellrun Hiis Hauge, Belinda Cleeland and Douglas Clyde Wilson
The	scope	of	human	dependence	on	marine	life	is	significant,	both	in	terms	of	the	nutritional	
value	 provided	 by	 fish	 and	 other	 seafood	 to	 populations	 (especially	 in	 the	 developing	


















































both	human	and	environmental	 (A2)	 [Richards	and	Maguire,	1998].	 In	 the	case	of	 the	Atlanto-Scandian	herring	















Of	course,	having	access	 to	reliable	knowledge	about	fish	stocks	 is	not	sufficient	 in	 itself	 for	good	governance,	










































Overview of the risk issue
GM	 crops	 are	 created	 through	 genetic	 engineering	 to	 express	 desirable	 traits,	 such	 as	 pesticide	 or	 herbicide	
resistance	or	increased	quantities	of	vitamins	or	amino	acids.	This	is	done	by	identifying	and	isolating	a	gene	that	





risks	 from	GM	crops	and	 foods	 included:	 creation	or	 transfer	of	allergens,	development	of	antibiotic	 resistance	
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[Tait	and	Levidow,	1992].	Companies	developing	GM	crops	 in	Europe	 initially	collaborated	willingly	with	 the	EU	
approach,	partly	because	they	saw	it	as	a	means	of	reassuring	the	public	and	partly	because	they	expected	the	
































argument,	 so	 that	 an	 amicable	 resolution	 to	 the	 debate	 over	GM	crop	 regulation	was	unlikely.	Regulators	 had	
the	opportunity	 to	decide	whether	 such	 ideologically-motivated	opposition	should	dominate	decision-making	 for	
society	as	a	whole	and	they	chose	to	respond	to	prevailing	European	political	pressures	(B12).	The	precautionary	
regulatory	regime	in	the	EU,	in	comparison	to	that	of	the	US,	is	less	evidence-based	and	more	driven	by	political	
and	advocacy	group	 influences	 than	by	 formal	approaches	 to	 risk	governance.	The	outcome	 is	 inefficient	 (B4),	
providing	an	example	of	using	scarce	 resources	 for	unimportant	 risks	and	of	 regulation	based	on	 inappropriate	
analyses	of	costs,	benefits,	and	other	social	and	environmental	impacts.










The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic in the UK 
By Belinda Cleeland
The	 emergence	 of	 Bovine	 Spongiform	 Encephalopathy	 (BSE)	 in	 the	UK	 and	 the	 early	

















At	 the	time	of	 the	outbreak,	 the	novelty	of	 the	disease	meant	 that	 there	was	no	knowledge	about	 its	pathology,	
and	so	decisions	had	to	be	made	on	the	basis	of	guesswork	and	analogy	with	scrapie,	a	well-studied	spongiform	
P 75







European	 countries	 have	 reported	hundreds	of	 cases	 (Portugal,	 Ireland	and	France	were	worst	 affected),	with	
the	number	of	cases	in	the	UK	nearing	200,000	[OIE,	2007].	Apart	from	the	obvious	impact	on	animal	and	human	

































10)		Unless	otherwise	noted,	the	following	information	is	based	upon	facts	contained	in	The BSE Inquiry: The Report. The Inquiry into BSE and vCJD 


































The subprime crisis of 2007-08 in the United States 
In the course of this report, the case of the US subprime crisis of 2007-08 has been used to 
illustrate several risk governance deficits. The following text is a brief overview of the context 
in which the crisis unfolded. It does not intend to represent a comprehensive analysis, but 
only to put in perspective the examples given in the report. IRGC acknowledges the fact 
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Overview of the risk issue
A	period	of	historically-low	 interest	 rates,	 starting	 in	 the	early	2000s,	enabled	 large	numbers	of	US	consumers	
to	obtain	mortgages	for	 the	first	 time.	At	 the	same	time,	more	 lenders	decided	to	offer	mortgages	to	higher	risk	








backed	securities	 that	were	 then	sold	on	 the	open	market.	These	were	 then	 repackaged	 in	evermore	complex	






Many	 other	 factors	 were	 influential.	 For	 example,	 incentive	 schemes	 (not	 least	 those	 influencing	 lenders	 and	
securities’	traders)	encouraged	behaviours	that	further	increased	the	risk;	actions	(and	inaction)	by	regulators	were	
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An	analysis	of	the	causes	of	the	Great	Depression	led	to	the	passing	of	the	Glass-Steagall	Act	in	the	US	in	1933,	

































that	 their	 actions	were	 ‘safe’.	However,	 an	over-reliance	on	mathematical	models	 (A9)	 led	many	 institutions	 to	
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Ambiguity: Giving	rise	to	several	meaningful	and	legitimate	interpretations	of	accepted	risk	assessment	results.	
Ambiguity	can	be	 interpretive	 (where	different	 interpretations	of	an	 identical	assessment	 result	are	possible)	or	
normative	(where	different	concepts	of	criteria	or	yardsticks	that	help	to	determine	what	can	be	regarded	as	tolerable	
can	be	used)	[IRGC,	2005].









on	society,	which	 is	not	borne	by	 the	 factories;	 it	 is	an	external	cost.	Emissions	 trading	schemes	are	a	method	










The	classical	definition	of	knowledge,	as	 formulated	by	Plato,	 is	 “justified	 true	belief”.	However,	epistemologists	
continue	to	debate	the	meaning	of	“knowledge”	and,	as	such,	there	is	no	agreed-upon	definition.
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Risk appetite:	The	amount	and	type	of	risk	that	an	organisation	is	prepared	to	pursue,	retain	or	take	[ISO,	2009].
Risk assessment:	 The	 task	 of	 identifying	 and	 exploring,	 preferably	 in	 quantified	 terms,	 the	 types,	 intensities	























Stakeholders (in risk issues):	Socially	organised	groups	that	are	or	will	be	affected	by	the	outcome	of	the	event	or	
the	activity	from	which	the	risk	originates	and/or	by	the	risk	management	options	taken	to	counter	the	risks	[IRGC,	
2005].
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